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Th i s  report  p re sen t s  the  r e s u l t s  of Task 8 of NASA con t rac t  NASL-17411, 
"Automatic Control  Design Procedures f o r  Res t ruc turable  Ai rc ra f t  Controls." 
The purpose of t h i s  t a s k  w a s  t o  i n t e g r a t e  the  c o n t r o l  redesign and automatic  
t r i m  procedures which have been developed [1]* wi th  t h e  f a i l u r e  de t ec t ion /  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  (FDI) algori thms being developed under con t r ac t  no. NASl-18004, 
[2]. The output of t h i s  task w a s  a For t r an  program t h a t  implemented a com- 
p l e t e  r e s t r u c t u r a b l e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system (RFCS) on NASA's modified B-737 
a i r c r a f t  s imula t ion  f o r  a s ing le  f l i g h t  condi t ion.  Th i s  report  documents the 
development of t h i s  prototype RFCS, d i scusses  the r e s u l t s  of s imulat ions a t  
NASA, and draws some conclusions.  Table 1-1 shows t h e  breakdown of t he  e n t i r e  
p r o j e c t  by task. 
U n t i l  now, the  ind iv idua l  components of a pro to type  RFCS have been 
developed independently under t w o  con t r ac t s  (NASl-17411 and NASl-18004) t o  
ALPHATECH, Inc.  (see [1] , [2]) .  While much i n t e r a c t i o n  between these  e f f o r t s  
has  taken place,  t he  d e t a i l s  of i n t eg ra t ing  these  components were not i n i -  
t i a l l y  addressed. The independent work provided oppor tuni ty  fo r  g r e a t e r  depth 
i n  t h e  research  e f f o r t s  and de ta i l ed  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and l i m i t a -  
t i o n s  of t he  var ious  subsystems. These  i n i t i a l  e f f o r t s  have been combined i n  
*References a r e  ind ica t ed  by numbers i n  square b racke t s ,  the l i s t  appears  at 
t h e  end of the main body of t h i s  report .  
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t h i s  e f f o r t  i n  order  t o  eva lua te  the  o v e r a l l  s y s t e m  concept,  and t o  determine 
t h e  need for a d d i t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n a l i t y .  
TABLE 1-1. TASK BREAKDOWN FOR NASA CONTRACT NO. NASL-17411 
Task 1 Development of an Automatic Control Design Procedure 
f o r  Res t ruc turable  Controls 
Task 2 
Task 3 
Task 4 Reporting 
F l i g h t  Control Design Demonstration 
Appl ica t ion  t o  an A i r c r a f t  with a S i n g l e  F a i l u r e  
Task 5 Perform a Complete Linearized Evalua t ion  of t he  
Automatic Design Algorithm 
Task 6 Apply the  Automatic Design Algorithm t o  a Nonlinear 
Simulation Model 
Task 7 Extend t h e  Res t ruc tur ing  Algorithm t o  Inc lude  Linear  
and Nonlinear T r i m  
Task 8 I n t e g r a t e d  Automatic Control and FDI Designs 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
A s  a i r c r a f t  become inc reas ing ly  soph i s t i ca t ed ,  and as s ta t ic  s t a b i l i t y  
i s  decreased i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of e f f i c i e n c y  and maneuverabili ty,  t he  poten- 
t i a l  damage caused by unant ic ipa ted  f a i l u r e  increases  dramatically.  
p i l o t s  can be t r a i n e d  t o  react i n  the  case of a n t i c i p a t e d  major f a i l u r e s ,  
Although 
they  cannot be expected t o  respond c o r r e c t l y ,  and i n  t i m e ,  f o r  a l l  conceiv- 
a b l e  f a i l u r e s .  Th i s  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  f r u s t r a t i n g  because modern a i r c r a f t ,  
w i t h  complex c o n t r o l s ,  may remain c o n t r o l l a b l e  d e s p i t e  i nd iv idua l  f a i l u r e s ,  
as happened recent ly  i n  two w e l l  publicized cases. Xn one case, (a Delta . 

































t o  save  t h e  plane.  I n  another ,  ( t h e  Chicago DC-10 crash [ 4 ] )  t h e  p i l o t  could 
n o t ,  a l though h i n d s i g h t  revealed the plane probably could have been saved. 
The o b j e c t i v e  of a r e s t ruc tu rab le  f l i g h t  con t ro l  system (RFCS) i s  t o  
s o l v e  au tomat i ca l ly  and quickly t h e  con t ro l  problem fac ing  a p i l o t  dur ing  a n  
emergency. The class of problems of i n t e r e s t  includes those where t h e  f a i l -  
u r e  or - f a i l u r e s  are unant ic ipa ted ,  b u t  excludes those unsolvable areas ( t o t a l  
wing s e p a r a t i o n )  where the  plane cannot be saved. 
The development of an  automatic RFCS is best  viewed as a problem i n  
f a i l u r e  accommodation. That is, we wish t o  design a f l i g h t  con t ro l  system 
t h a t  ts t o l e r a n t  of t hose  f a i l u r e  modes tha t  cannot adequately be handled by 
t h e  p i l o t  i n  a n  emergency. As ind ica ted  i n  Fig. 1-1, t h i s  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
o p e r a t i o n  can be achieved e i t h e r  passively (through t h e  use of robust  c o n t r o l  
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Figure  1-1. F a i l u r e  Accommodation Decomposition 
Pass ive  f a u l t  t o l e r a n c e  can  be thought of as robustness  -- t h e  a i r c r a f t  
w i t h  i t s  normal f l i g h t  con t ro l  system ( including the  p i l o t )  can t o l e r a t e  
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c e r t a i n  f a i l u r e s  without modification. Other f a i l u r e s ,  however, may be t o o  
s e v e r e  f o r  t h e  normal ( i .e. ,  any acceptab le  normal) c o n t r o l l e r  t o  handle,  and 
t h u s  r e q u i r e  ac t ive  system modification. This modi f ica t ion  involves (implic- 
i t l y  or e x p l i c i t l y )  two processes: 1) f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n  and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
( i n c l u d i n g  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of a pos t - f a i lu re  system model) and 2)  c o n t r o l  
sys tem reconf igu ra t ion  i n  l i g h t  of t he  i d e n t i f i e d  f a i l u r e .  
F igure  1-2 prov ides  a func t iona l  desc r ip t ion  of a RFCS which e x p l o i t s  
b o t h  p a s s i v e  and a c t i v e  f a i l u r e  accommodation technologies.  
sists of a robust mu l t iva r i ab le  f l i g h t  con t ro l  system, a f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n  
and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  a lgor i thm and a procedure f o r  automatic c o n t r o l  system 
redes ign .  
The system con- 
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The robust  mu l t iva r i ab le  f l i g h t  con t ro l  system i s  used in the  RFCS t o  
a c h i e v e  a high degree of passive f a u l t  tolerance t o  "minor" f a i l u r e s ,  and t o  
p rov ide  a s a f e t y  margin f o r  "major" f a i l u r e s  so t h a t  the  a c t i v e  components 
have t i m e  t o  operate .  To achieve t h i s ,  the c o n t r o l  design must  e x p l o i t  t h e  
i n h e r e n t  c o n t r o l  redundancy i n  t h e  a i r c r a f t  i n  order  t o  minimize the  e f f e c t s  
of a c t u a t o r  f a i l u r e s  and o the r  damage. It is, however, un l ike ly  t h a t  a robust  
c o n t r o l  system a lone  w i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  handle t h e  wide range of f a i l u r e /  
damage modes t h a t  must be accommodated. Even i f  poss ib l e ,  passive accommoda- 
t i o n  could  r e q u i r e  i n f e a s i b l y  high loop gains  and bandwidths, might compromise 
t h e  performance of t h e  unfa i led  a i r c r a f t ,  o r  could r equ i r e  unnecessar i ly  com- 
p l e x  FCS hardware. Nonetheless, a properly designed robust  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
sys t em app l i ed  t o  t h e  un fa i l ed  a i r c r a f t  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  handle the  less severe  
fa i lure /damage  modes and w i l l  lengthen the  t i m e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  reconf igur ing  
t h e  FCS. 
The mre severe failure/damage modes will r equ i r e  a reconf igura t ion  of 
t h e  FCS. As i n d i c a t e d  i n  Fig. 1-2, reconf igura t ion  is  i n i t i a t e d  by a FDI  
sys tem t h a t  mst detect a l l  condi t ions t h a t  may p o t e n t i a l l y  lend t o  emergency 
c o n d i t i o n s  as w e l l  as i d e n t i f y  t h e  remaining c o n t r o l  c a p a b i l i t y  of t he  f a i l e d  
a i r c r a f t .  The problems of f a l s e  alarms and missed d e t e c t i o n s  i n  the  FDI sys- 
t e m  are minimized due to  the  ex is tence  of a robust  nominal con t ro l  system. 
As noted above, t h e  nominal con t ro l  system is designed t o  handle as many as 
p o s s i b l e  of t he  failure/damage condi t ions.  The FDI system is  then requi red  
t o  handle  only fai lure/damages t h a t  severe ly  impact performance. As t h e  
s e v e r i t y  of t he  impact of a f a i l u r e  on t h e  a i rcraf t  performance inc reases ,  
t h e  urgency of r e a c t i o n  increases  and the  t i m e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  reconfigure 
dec reases .  However, t h i s  trend is compensated by the  corresponding inc rease  
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i n  t h e  s igna ture  of t h e  f a i l u r e ,  which reduces the  t i m e  needed by t h e  FDI 
system t o  respond. This  phenomenon, coupled with the  effects of t he  robust  
c o n t r o l  system and robus t  FDI design techniques,  should allow a properly 
des igned  FDI s y s t e m  v i r t u a l l y  t o  e l imina te  the  problem of false alarms and 
missed detect ion.  
The las t  component i n  Fig. 1-2, t he  automatic redesign module (ARM), 
u s e s  the  information about f a i l u r e s  provided by t h e  FDI system t o  modify the  
nominal robus t  FCS. To be e f f e c t i v e ,  t he  new c o n t r o l  system must be a b l e  t o  
r e c o n s t r u c t  the d e s i r e d  forces  and moments as much as poss ib le  given t h e  pres- 
ence  of large d is turbances  due t o  f a i l u r e s  and, very important ly ,  c o n s t r a i n t s  
on t h e  c o n t r o l  system (e.g., ac tua t ion  limits, bandwidth l i m i t s ,  etc.) Since 
c o n t r o l  system c o n s t r a i n t s  were important in the  design of the nominal robus t  
c o n t r o l  system, t h e  engineering t radeof  f s  t h a t  went i n t o  t h a t  design should 
be r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  new con t ro l  design. Furthermore, t he  ARM should be t o l -  
e r a n t  of FDI l imi t a t ions .  Incorpora t ion  of FDI unce r t a in ty  i n t o  t h e  redesign 
procedure  w i l l  a l low t h e  new con t ro l  system t o  hedge aga ins t  imperfect ly  
d e t e c t e d  o r  i s o l a t e d  f a i l u r e s .  F i n a l l y ,  g race fu l  degradat ion of performance 
as t h e  s e v e r i t y  of f a i l u r e  increases  should be a property of the ARM and can 
be  obta ined  by ensur ing  t h a t  the  nominal con t ro l  s y s t e m  is recovered by the  
ARM when no f a i l u r e s  are present.  
F igure  1-3 p r e s e n t s  the prototype RFCS t h a t  has been developed f o r  t h i s  
p r o j e c t  wi th  the above i s sues  i n  mind. Control of t h e  a i rc raf t  i s  e f f e c t e d  
through a dynamic feedback compensator t h a t  nominally provides command fo l -  
lowing,  dis turbance r e j e c t i o n ,  and s t a b i l i t y  augmentation for  the u n f a t l e d  
a i r c r a f t  without v i o l a t i n g  the c o n s t r a i n t s  of t he  ac tua t ion  mechanisms. In 




































t h e  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  amongst many independent c o n t r o l  elements. This r e s u l t s  
i n  t h e  nonstandard use of standard c o n t r o l  su r f aces  (e.g., c o l l e c t i v e  a i l e r o n  
d e f l e c t i o n )  and impl ies  a p o t e n t i a l  f o r  increased s a f e t y  from fu tu re  develop- 
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Figure  1-3. Res t ruc turable  Cont ro l  System 
The purpose of t h e  FDI system is t o  monitor t h e  a i r c r a f t  r e l i a b l y  and t o  
i n d i c a t e  t h e  presence of condi t ions  which are beyond t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of t h e  
normal ly  configured system. Such a system must be gene ra l  enough t o  respond 
t o  a v a r i e t y  of f a i l u r e  modes ( inc luding  those  t h a t  would not degrade system 
performance f o r  maintenance purposes) y e t  be maximally s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h o s e  
f a i l u r e s  t h a t  are of c r i t i ca l  importance. I n  terms of f l i gh t - sa fe ty  and 
o v e r a l l  aircraft  s u r v i v a b i l i t y ,  i t  seems obvious t h a t  changes i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  
a u t h o r i t y  of any c o n t r o l  element are  most important. 
FDI system must use sensors  of some k ind ,  t he  a b i l i t y  t o  respond t o  senso r  
However, s i n c e  c_ any 
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f a i l u r e s ,  becomes c r i t i c a l  i n  terms of the  opera t iona l  r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e  FDI 
system. Thus, both con t ro l  element f a i l u r e s  and sensor  f a i l u r e s  should be 
handled e x p l i c i t l y  i n  the  FDI system t o  ensure maximal FDI performance during 
t h e s e  f a i l u r e  condi t ions.  Other f a i l u r e  modes may need t o  be de tec ted  (e.g., 
n o n f l i g h t - c r i t i c a l  equipment, small aerodynamic changes); however, less 
e x p l i c i t  information is  needed i n  these  cases i n  order  t o  e f f e c t  a u s e f u l  
c o n t r o l  redesign. 
F i n a l l y ,  redesign of the con t ro l  system is accomplished through two 
f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  make maximal use of t h e  information t h a t  is p o t e n t i a l l y  ava i l -  
a b l e  from a f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n  and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  algori thm. The feedback con- 
t r o l  redes ign  procedure discussed i n  [l] i s  based on t h e  l i n e a r  q u a d r a t i c  (LQ) 
d e s i g n  procedure and a t t e m p t s  t o  recover as much performance as poss ib l e  (as 
measured by the r e t u r n  d i f f e rence  func t ion)  while  maintaining the  a c t u a t o r  
bandwidth c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  were present  ( e i t h e r  e x p l i c i t l y  o r  i m p l i c i t l y )  i n  
t h e  o r i g i n a l  feedback con t ro l  design. The automatic t r i m  system makes use  of 
t h e  observable  p a r t s  of the dis turbances t h a t  e x i s t  fol lowing a f a i l u r e  by 
f e e d i n g  forward a c o n t r o l  so lu t ion  t h a t  i s  a funct ion of the  des i r ed  steady- 
s t a t e  ou tpu t s  and t h e  observed dis turbance.  Since t h e  d is turbance  must be 
observedles t imated  a f t e r  the f a i l u r e  occurs,  and s i n c e  i t  may take  on a con- 
tinuum of values, t h e  automatic t r i m  problem must be solved on-line. 
1.2 SUMMARY 
The purpose of t h i s  study w a s  t o  examine t h e  complementary c a p a b i l i t i e s  
of s e v e r a l  r e s t r u c t u r a b l e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system (RFCS) concepts through t h e  
i n t e g r a t i o n  of these technologies i n t o  a complete system. Performance i s sues  








































th rough a q u a l i t a t i v e  ana lys i s  of the design i s s u e s  t h a t ,  i f  properly addressed 
d u r i n g  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  will lead t o  the  h ighes t  poss ib le  degree of f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
performance. Software developed under previous phases of t h i s  con t r ac t  and 
under  NASL-18004 w a s  modified and in tegra ted  i n t o  a complete RFCS subrout ine  
f o r  NASA's B-737 simulat ion.  The in t eg ra t ion  of these  modules involved t h e  
development of methods f o r  dea l ing  with the  mismatch between the  outputs  of 
t h e  f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n  module and the  inpu t  requirements of t he  automatic 
c o n t r o l  system redes ign  module. The performance of t h i s  demonstration system 
w a s  examined through extensive s imulat ion trials. 
I n  Sec t ion  5 we present  d e t a i l s  of an RFCS des ign  f o r  a modified B-737 
a i r c r a f t .  This  RFCS inc ludes  func t iona l  elements t o  d e t e c t  and i s o l a t e  
aircraf t-path and actuator-path con t ro l  element f a i l u r e s ,  t o  redesign t h e  
feedback  compensator a f t e r  a f a i l u r e  has  been de tec ted ,  and t o  retrim t h e  
a i r c r a f t  when s i g n i f i c a n t  measurable d is turbances  are present .  The RFCS d i d  
n o t  i nc lude  any func t ion  to  es t imate  remaining c o n t r o l  e f f ec t iveness  o r  t o  
estimate ( r a t h e r  than measure) s i g n i f i c a n t  dis turbances.  
Extensive tests using NASA's nonlinear 6-DOF s imula t ion  were made. These 
tests w e r e  aimed a t  examining the  i m p a c t  of FDI de l ays  and incomplete FDI 
d e c i s i o n s  as w e l l  as examining t h e  recovery c a p a b i l i t y  of t he  compensator 
r e d e s i g n  and retrim algorithms. I n  all, over 40 s imula t ion  runs were made. 
A d i s c u s s i o n  of s e v e r a l  s p e c i f i c  runs is given i n  subsec t ion  5.2. Subsect ion 
5.3 provides  a gene ra l  summary of the r e s u l t s  and Sec t ion  6 concludes wi th  
s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  work. We believe t h a t  the key conclusions are: 
1. Reconfigurat ion can provide a mechanism fo r  f a i l u r e  recovery 
t h a t  f u l l y  u t i l i z e s  the remaining (pos t - f a i lu re )  con t ro l  
a u t h o r i t y  and achieves a high degree of fau l t - to le rance ,  even 
f o r  major f a i l u r e s .  
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2. The RFCS demonstrated i n  t h i s  report  performed q u i t e  w e l l .  
Fa i lure  d e t e c t i o n  w a s  accomplished with de lays  t h a t  were more 
than  adequate f o r  good f a i l u r e  recovery. Redesigned compen- 
s a t o r s  provided improved s t a b i l i t y  augmentation and new t r i m  
so lu t ions  allowed recovery from the seve res t  f a i l u r e s .  
3 .  The automatic recovery procedures, e spec ia l ly  i n  some of t h e  
severe f a i l u r e  cases, are somestimes cont ra ry  t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  
p i l o t  t r a i n i n g  (e.g., reduce t h r o t t l e  a t  high pitch-up and 
slowing a i r speed  condi t ions) .  This is not unexpected s i n c e  
t r a i n i n g  cannot a n t i c i p a t e  a l l  types of f a i l u r e s ,  whereas 
t h e  RFCS is designed t o  solve these  previously-unanticipated 
problems. 
f i g u r a t i o n  is f r equen t ly  based on p i l o t  t r a i n i n g ,  shown he re  
t o  be a n  inadequate  s o l u t i o n  i n  some cases- 
Note t h a t  t h e  "expert-system" approach t o  recon- 
4. Proper des ign  of t he  nominal f l i g h t  con t ro l  system can r e s u l t  
i n  large degrees of passive f a u l t  to le rance  and, thereby, make 
t h e  FDI system design s u b s t a n t i a l l y  easier (i.e., d e t e c t i o n  
of "large" f a i l u r e s  can be nude with more r e l i a b i l i t y  (h ighe r  
de t ec t ion  and lower f a l s e  alarm probab i l i t i e s ) ) .  
5 .  Highly f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  RFCS design can be achieved only i f  t h e  
various func t ions  (ARM, FCS, FDI) are complementary. Analysis  
methods t h a t  allow c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of FCS fa i lure- robus tness  
i n  terms of FDI performance spec i f i ca t ions ,  and o the r  i n t e g r a t e d  


































REVIEW OF RFCS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS 
The purpose of t h e  work described i n  t h i s  repor t  w a s  t o  assess t h e  
c a p a b i l i t i e s  of t h e  RFCS technologies developed by ALPHATECH under c o n t r a c t s  
NAS1-18004 and NAS1-17411 by in t eg ra t ing  them i n t o  a complete r e s t r u c t u r a b l e  
* ."  
c o n t r o l  system. Th i s  s e c t i o n  b r i e f l y  descr ibes  the  technologies  t o  be i n t e -  
g r a t e d .  Fu r the r  d e t a i l s  are ava i lab le  i n  [ l]  and [ 5 ] .  
The o v e r a l l  RFCS shown i n  Fig. 1-2 is  broken down i n t o  t h r e e  f u n c t i o n a l  
e lements;  F a i l u r e  De tec t ion  and I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  (FDI) , a robus t  m u l t i v a r i a b l e  
Flight Contro l  System (FCS), and an  Automatic ( c o n t r o l  system) Redesign Module 
(ARM). The ARM is composed of a feedback compensator redesign a lgor i thm and a 
feedforward re-trim algorithm. 
Robust m u l t i v a r i a b l e  f l i g h t  cont ro l  technology has been developed exten- 
s i v e l y  over  t h e  last 20 years  and will not be discussed i n  t h i s  s ec t ion .  
However, i t  is  important  t o  note tha t  f o r  f a u l t  t o l e rance ,  both s t a b i l i t y  and 
performance robus tness  are important. Thus, the not ion  t h a t  one must t rade-  
o f f  nominal performance and robustness in the  design of a FCS system is  only 
p a r t i a l l y  true (it a p p l i e s  t o  s t a b i l i t y  robustness but  not t o  performance) . 
In a d d i t i o n ,  pi lot- in- the loop concerns f u r t h e r  modify t h i s  ''classical'' 
t r a d e o f  f not ion ( s i n c e  l a rge  FCS s t a b i l i t y  margins sometimes adverse ly  a f f e c t  
hand l ing  q u a l i t i e s ) .  In t h i s  project we u t i l i z e d  the  LQ methodology f o r  t h e  
b a s e l i n e  FCS des ign  ( t h e  compensator redesign algori thm i s  based on LQ i d e a s  
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a l s o ) .  Thus, t h e  conclusions drawn about passive FCS f au l t - to l e rance  are all 
f o r  LQ des igns  (known t o  have good t h e o r e t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  margins). Explora- 
t i o n  of f a u l t  t o l e r a n t  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of o ther  design methods is a suggested 
area of f u r t h e r  s tudy.  
The rema inde r  of t h i s  s ec t ion  o u t l i n e s  the  b a s i c  ideas  and c a p a b i l i t i e s  
of t h e  FDI system, t h e  compensator redesign algori thm and the  retrim algo- 
r i thm.  F i r s t ,  however, a br ie f  desc r ip t ion  of the  f a i l u r e  modes of i n t e r e s t  
is given. 
2 1 FAILURE WIDDELS 
The RFCS technologies  descr ibed i n  t h i s  s ec t ion  are capable of dea l ing  
w i t h  a broad class of f a i l u r e s .  We have l imi ted  t h i s  s tudy t o  con t ro l  element 
f a i l u r e s  because of t h e i r  c r i t i c a l i t y .  I n  genera l ,  we can descr ibe  v i r t u a l l y  
any c o n t r o l  element f a i l u r e  as follows. L e t  6,., da,  and 6e be a commanded 
c o n t r o l  value, an a c t u a t o r  output ,  and an  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  value,  respec- 
t i v e l y  (see Fig. 2-1). Both normal and f a i l e d  ope ra t ion  of a con t ro l  element 
are descr ibed  by, 
6a(S) = A(s)Gc(s) + da( s )  (2-1) 
where s denotes t h e  Laplace t ransformation var iab le .  Under i d e a l  no- fa i lure  
c i rcumstances  E ( s )  = 1, da( s )  = d,(s) = 0 and A(s) r ep resen t s  the  u n f a i l e d  
dynamics of t h e  ac tua to r .  
S p e c i f i c  actuator-path f a i l u r e s  can be defined by d i f f e r e n t  values  f o r  



























F i g u r e  2-1. Measurement Configuration and Analy t ic  Redundancy Impl i ca t ions  
TABLE 2-1. ACTUATOR-PATH FAILURE MODELS 
-- --- --- -- ---- 
Stuck A =  0 da ( t )  = cons tan t  
F loa t ing  A = 0 da(s) - K ( s )  * ( l o c a l  ang le  of a t t a c k )  
Runaway A = 0 da ( t )  = slewed t o  c o n t r o l  l i m i t  
S p e c i f i c  a i r c r a f t - p a t h  f a i l u r e s  can be defined by d i f f e r e n t  va lues  of 
E ( s )  and de(s).  Common d e f i n i t i o n s  of a i r c r a f t - p a t h  f a i l u r e s  are shown i n  
Tab le  2-2. 
TABLE 2-2. AIRCRAFT-PATH FAILURE MODES 
_--___ -- 
Stuck E =  0 de ( t )  = cons tan t  
F loa t ing  E = 0 de(s) = K ( s )  * ( l o c a l  ang le  of a t t a c k )  
Pa r t i a l  E < 1 de = 0 or, 
Loss 
= (1-E)K(s)  * (local angle  or attack) de 
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Note t h a t  most a c t u a t o r  path f a i l u r e s  r e s u l t  i n  zero c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  (A=O) 
whereas some commonly discussed a i r c r a f t - p a t h  f a i l u r e s  have nonzero e f f e c -  
t i v e n e s s  (E#O). This  s i t u a t i o n  will have an impact on how the  FDI r e s u l t s  
are  i n t e r p r e t e d  f o r  use  by the  c o n t r o l  redesign procedure. 
2 .2  FAILURE DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION (FDI) 
The FDI a lgor i thm that w a s  developed under c o n t r a c t  no. NAS1-18004 
focused  on t he  g e n e r a l  problem of d e t e c t i n g  and i d e n t i f y i n g  c o n t r o l  element 
f a i l u r e s .  This focus  stems not only from the  f a c t  that  such f a i l u r e s  can 
r e s u l t  in emergency condi t ions ,  but a l s o  because - any r e s t r u c t u r a b l e  c o n t r o l  
system is l imi ted  in i ts  a b i l i t y  t o  respond t o  emergency condi t ions  by t h e  
amount of remaining c o n t r o l  au tho r i ty .  Thus, the  J?DI system must  d e t e c t  such 
f a i l u r e s  - and i d e n t i f y  t h e  remaining c o n t r o l  au tho r i ty .  
oped i n  NASl-18004 (see [5]) maximizes t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  con t ro l  element 
The a lgor i thm devel- 
f a i l u r e s  by e x p l i c i t l y  inc luding  appropr i a t e  f a i l u r e  hypotheses i n  i ts  
ope ra t ion .  
F igure  2-1 d e s c r i b e s  t h e  information flow which is' ava i l ab le  f o r  FDI 
f o r  a n  assumed measurement conf igura t ion .  The f i g u r e  f i r s t  shows s e v e r a l  par- 
a l l e l  ac tua to r  pa ths  in which f a i l u r e s  of each ac tua to r  can be independently 
d e t e c t e d  through t h e  use  of t he  a n a l y t i c a l  redundancy which is  embedded i n  the  
independent ac tua to r  models. That is, "actuator-path" f a i l u r e s  can be de teced  
by comparing a p red ic t ed  a c t u a t o r  ou tput  (based on t h e  measured inpu t ,  6,, and 
a n  a c t u a t o r  m d e l )  w i t h  the measured output ,  6m. 
Although many c o n t r o l  element f a i l u r e  modes are covered by such compari- 
sons, t h e r e  are  o t h e r  f a i l u r e s  modes which are not. This  is a l s o  i l l u s t r a t e d  
































c o n t r o l  va lue  which a c t u a l l y  moves t h e  a i rp l ane )  d i f f e r s  from the measured 
o u t p u t  of t he  a c t u a t o r ,  then a cont ro l  element f a i l u r e  a l s o  e x i s t s .  These 
f a i l u r e s  can be de t ec t ed  by t h e  use of the  a n a l y t i c a l  redundancy which is 
embedded in an a i r c r a f t  model. That is, "a i rc raf t -pa th"  f a i l u r e s  can be 
d e t e c t e d  by comparing t h e  measured r o t i o n  va r i ab le s  (which are a f u n c t i o n  of 
t h e  a i r c r a f t  states) w i t h  a predic t ion  of these v a r i a b l e s  based on t h e  c o n t r o l  
measurements. 
C l e a r l y ,  from t h e  f i g u r e ,  a l l  con t ro l  e lement  f a i l u r e s  could be d e t e c t e d  
u s i n g  a n  a i r c r a f t  model t h a t  includes t h e  ac tua tor  models thereby e l i m i n a t i n g  
the need f o r  a c t u a t o r  ou tput  measurements and reducing t h e  c o s t  and weight 
a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  senso r  hardware and redundancy management. However, t h e  
p a r a l l e l  ac tua tor -pa th  FDI algorithms are very simple and r e l i a b l e .  As a 
r e s u l t ,  t h e  FDI system developed i n  [SI conta ins  independent ac tua tor -pa th  
and a i r c r a f  t-path algorithms. 
The s t r u c t u r e  of both ac tua tor -  and a i r c ra f t -pa th  FDI systems developed 
i n  [5] invo lves  a monitoring o r  t r i g g e r  process and a v e r i f i c a t i o n  and/or 
i s o l a t i o n  process. The t r i g g e r  process is used t o  reject the hypothes is  of 
normal ope ra t ion  and t o  t r i g g e r  t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  and i s o l a t i o n  processes  which 
reject f a l s e  t r i g g e r s  and i d e n t i f y  t h e  source of a f a i l u r e .  This s t r u c t u r e  is 
used t o  achieve performance advantages which approach the  performance of known 
onset-t ime a lgor i thm without undue complexity. The advantages inc lude  g r e a t e r  
f a i l u r e  s e n s i t i v i t y ,  lower f a l s e  alarm rates, and s h o r t e r  de t ec t ion  de lays .  
2.2.1 Aircraf t-Path Subsystem 
The a i r c r a f t - p a t h  t r i g g e r  w a s  designed t o  make the p r o b a b i l i t y  of missing 
a c r i t i ca l  f a i l u r e  s m a l l .  Thus, each f a i l u r e  mode has an e x p l i c i t  t r i g g e r  
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f u n c t i o n  t h a t  is optimized f o r  t r i g g e r i n g  under the  corresponding f a i l u r e  
mode. Each t r igge r  s a t i s f i e s  the condi t ion  t h a t  I F  a p a r t i c u l a r  "minimal" 
f a i l u r e  occurs ,  THEN t h e  corresponding t r i g g e r  test w i l l  "pass." Since the  
conve r se  i s  not necessa r i ly  t r u e  and s i n c e  f a l s e  t r i g g e r s  are poss ib l e ,  
v e r i f y  and i s o l a t e  tests are performed. 
The ve r i fy  and i s o l a t e  tests are binary-hypothesis s e q u e n t i a l  tests, and 
are designed so t h a t  f a i l u r e s  tha t  are l a r g e r  than some minimal va lue  w i l l  be 
d e t e c t e d  and i s o l a t e d  i n  sho r t e r  t i m e  periods.  I f  t hese  tes ts  reach a maximal 
t i m e  l i m i t ,  no d e c i s i o n  ( i n  favor of e i t h e r  hypothesis)  i s  made. 
The i s o l a t i o n  process  recognizes the  f a c t  t h a t  on ly  the r e j e c t i o n  of 
f a i l u r e  mode hypotheses is poss ib le  when de ta i l ed  s i g n a t u r e  information is not 
used  (as is the case i n  [5]). This f a c t  r e s u l t s ,  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  i n  a ma t r ix  
of i s o l a t i o n  tests, each designed t o  reject a f a i l u r e  mode with maximal sen- 
s i t i v i t y  to another f a i l u r e  mode. Although t h i s  s t r u c t u r e  appears complex, 
i t  guarantees  opt imal  performance f o r  every f a i l u r e  mode and al lows d e t a i l e d  
a n a l y s i s  and opt imiza t ion  of each p a r t  of the system. I n  practice, t h e  off-  
d i a g o n a l  t e s t s  i n  t h i s  i s o l a t i o n  matr ix  were combined f o r  e f f i c i ency .  Also, 
i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  only those  f a i l u r e  modes which are i n  t h e  " t r igger- implied 
ambigui ty  group" need t o  be i s o l a t e d ,  although i n  practice a l l  f a i l u r e s  were 
cons ide red  as poss ib l e  following any t r igge r .  To d e c l a r e  a f a i l u r e ,  a l l  iso-  
l a t i o n  tests must "vote" i n  favor of t h a t  f a i l u r e ,  a l though a l t e r n a t e  dec i s ion  
mechanisms are  descr ibed  i n  Sect ion 3. 
2.2.2 Actuator-Path Subsystem 
The charac te r  of t he  ac tua tor  r e s idua l s  ( a l l  a c t u a t o r  f a i l u r e  d i r e c t i o n s  








































a c t u a t o r  f a i l u r e .  Thus, no i so l a t ion  process w a s  needed. These subsystems, 
l i k e  t h e  aircraf t-path subsystem, also used a t r i g g e r / v e r i f y  s t r u c t u r e  t o  
"so lve"  t h e  unknown onse t  t i m e  problem. Two dec is ion  processes  were c r e a t e d  
and t e s t e d ;  a f ixed  threshold  and a varying threshold algorithm. 
T h e  f i x e d  threshold  algorithm was designed t o  accommodate the  observed 
low frequency behavior i n  each res idua l ,  sensor noise ,  and o t h e r  high 
f requency  e r r o r s .  The r e s u l t  of a t r i g g e r  crossing its threshold i s  t h e  i n i -  
t i a t i o n  of a s e q u e n t i a l  v e r i f y  test. If the  v e r i f y  test passes ,  t h e  cor re-  
sponding c o n t r o l  element is declared as f a i l ed .  I f  a v e r i f y  f a i l s ,  a " f a l s e  
t r i g g e r "  is declared.  Because f ixed thresholds  were used t o  accommodate low 
f requency  e r r o r s ,  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  a c t u a t o r  path f a i l u r e s  w a s  higher  t han  
o r i g i n a l l y  expected (though by no means unacceptable).  
The varying th re sho ld  algorithm w a s  based on the  concept der ived i n  [SI 
f o r  s ing le- input ,  s ingle-output  systems with t r a n s f e r  func t ion  e r r o r s .  It 
assumed t h a t  a l l  t r a n s f e r  funct ion e r r o r s  were high frequency relative errors. 
Observa t ions  c l e a r l y  ind ica t ed  t h a t  t h i s  was not t he  case, and consequent ly ,  
t h i s  d e c i s i o n  process  d i d  not perform as w e l l  as expected. Fur ther  work i n  
t h i s  area is needed be fo re  substant ive conclusions can be drawn. For t h i s  
s tudy ,  t h e  f ixed  th re sho ld  algorithm w a s  used. 
2 -3  AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEM REDESIGN PROCEDURES 
The automatic  redes ign  procedures (auto-trim and compensator r edes ign )  
developed in t h i s  p r o j e c t  focused on incorpora t ing  a l l  l i k e l y  sources  of 
i n fo rma t ion  about t h e  f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t  i n t o  the redesigned c o n t r o l  system. 
The auto- t r im a lgor i thm u t i l i z e s  information ( l i n e a r  models) about t h e  
d e s i r e d  (un fa i l ed )  ope ra t ing  poin t ,  t h e  remaining c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y ,  and any 
1 7  
measurable d is turbances  (e.g., t he  e f f e c t  of a s tuck  off-centered c o n t r o l  
s u r f a c e )  t o  re-solve f o r  a new t r i m  condi t ion .  The compensator redes ign  algo- 
r i t h m  a l s o  uses l i n e a r  models fo r  t h e  des i r ed  ope ra t ing  poin t  and remaining 
c o n t r o l  au tho r i ty  information. It a l s o  u t i l i z e s  information about c o n t r o l  
bandwidths that  is embedded i n  state and con t ro l  weights f o r  an LQ "bas i s -  
compensator" (i.e.,  t h e  compensator r e s u l t i n g  from execut ion  of t he  redes ign  
a l g o r i t h m  w i t h  a n  un fa i l ed  a i r c r a f t  model). New c o n t r o l  ga ins  t h a t  ensu re  
r o b u s t  s t a b i l i t y  - and maximize command following performance, are then  output  
from t h e  algorithm following a de tec ted  and i s o l a t e d  f a i l u r e .  
To be s p e c i f i c  we assume, i n  both the  feedback c o n t r o l  redesign problem 
and the automatic t r i m  problem, t h a t  a des i red  equ i l ib r ium point of t h e  
u n f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t  i s  given and a l i n e a r  model of t he  f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t  a t  t h a t  
o p e r a t i n g  point is ava i l ab le .  That is, we assume t h a t  a f t e r  a f a i l u r e ,  t h e  
behavior  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  is modeled by 
xp = Axp + Eup f wp + 5 (2-1) 
where xp is t h e  p e r t u r b a t i o n  of t h e  s t a t e  vector from t h e  unfa i led  equ i l ib r ium 
v a l u e  %, up is t h e  pe r tu rba t ion  of t he  con t ro l  vec to r  from uo, wp is a vector 
of known or  measurable d is turbances ,  and < i s  an unknown disturbance. The 
s ta te  t r a n s i t i o n  and c o n t r o l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  matrices ( A , B )  model t h e  dynamics 
of t h e  f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t .  
2.3.1 Auto T r i m  
For cons tan t  nonzero d is turbances  wp (e.g., a s t u c k  con t ro l  s u r f a c e ) ,  
t h e  t r i m  s o l u t i o n  (xp, up) = 0 i s  clearly no longer a n  equi l ibr ium po in t  fo r  








































p o i n t  f o r  E q -  2-1, sub jec t  t o  t r a v e l  c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  con t ro l  elements. In 
a d d i t i o n ,  we impose the  cons t r a in t  t ha t  the  new equi l ibr ium states be wi th in  
t h e  r eg ion  of v a l i d i t y  f o r  t he  l i n e a r  model, and t h a t  no o the r  important s t a t e  
c o n s t r a i n t s  are v i o l a t e d  (e.g., minimum a i r  speeds). When a s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  
problem does not e x i s t ,  we wish t o  minimize t h e  depa r tu re  from some d e s i r a b l e  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  sub jec t  t o  t h e  same cons t r a in t s .  
Mathematically,  t h e  t r i m  problem is formulated as follows. L e t  t h e  
d e s i r e d  condi t ions ,  yd,  be represented by, 
Cons t r a in t s  on t h e  cont ro ls  and states can usua l ly  be given by s imple 
bounds, viz . ,  
... XL < xp < xu 
(2-3) 
UL < up < uu 
Next, d e f i n e  the objective function, 
t h e  f e a s i b l e  set, 
F = {xP,up: Eq. 2-3 ho lds )  
and the opt imizing set, 
D = {xp,up: (xp,up) = a r g  min J 2 )  




min J1 = llxp - xpoll + Uup - upoU 
s u b j e c t  t o  (xp, up) E F and D 
where xpo and upo are some des i red  a p r i o r i  pe r tu rba t ions  from xo,uo (usua l ly  
zero) .  
When Euclidean norms are used i n  Eqs. 2-4 and 2-7, the  t r i m  problem is 
reduced t o  a form which can be solved using quadra t i c  programming techniques 
(see [l] f o r  d e t a i l s  of t he  s o l u t i o n  method). 
* The so lu t ion  t o  t h e  t r i m  problem (xp , up*) i s  appl ied  t o  the  c o n t r o l  
e lements  as a feedforward term. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i f  t h e  LQ feedback g a i n  mat r ix  
is G ,  then L t  can be shown ([1],[6]) t h a t  the a p p l i c a t i o n  of 6 feed fomard  
= Gxp -t up * * a t  t = 0 w i l l  change Eq. 2-1 t o  
ip = (A - BG)(xp - xp*) -I- 5 . (2-8) 
* Since  (A -BG) is s t a b l e ,  xp + 0, and xp + xp . 
d i s tu rbances ,  wp, t h e  s o l u t i o n  to  Eq. 2-7 can  be obtained a t  each t i m e  t h a t  up 
i s  ava i l ab le .  The feedforward c o n t r o l  then serves  t o  reduce the e f f e c t  of wp, 
dynamically (see [ 6 ]  f o r  t h e o r e t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s ) .  
Furthermore, f o r  nonconstant 
O f  course,  e r r o r s  i n  t h e  l i n e a r  model of Eq. 2-1 w i l l  a lways  e x i s t  and, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  the s o l u t i o n  t o  Eq. 2-7 can  only ge t  us c l o s e  t o  the  des i r ed  con- 
d i t i o n s .  The feedback c o n t r o l  system, when properly designed, w i l l  ensu re  
t h a t  when a f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  exists (J2 = 0) t h e  a c t u a l  states w i l l  be  d r iven  
c l o s e  t o  t h e  values s e l e c t e d  by t h e  t r i m  problem. However, the  performance of 
t h e  feedback system ( i n  terms of d r iv ing  the a i r c r a f t  to a new s e l e c t e d  t r i m ,  





















degraded due t o  c o n t r o l  element f a i l u r e s .  Although t h i s  degradation may not 
be  Severe when s u f f i c i e n t l y  robust cont ro l  laws are used, i t  is, never the less ,  
of i n t e r e s t  t o  explore  methods of feedback compensator redesign. 
2.3.2 Compensator Redesign 
The goa l  of t he  feedback compensator redesign algori thm given i n  [l], 
is  t o  recover,  a f t e r  f a i l u r e ,  as much as poss ib le  of t h e  des i r ab le  p rope r t i e s  
of some nominal c o n t r o l  system ( f o r  t h e  unfai led a i r c r a f t )  sub jec t  t o  t h e  
c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  t h e  new compensator not v i o l a t e  any control-loop bandwidth 
c o n s t r a i n t s .  The bandwidth cons t r a in t s  are imposed so t h a t  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  
robus tness  p r o p e r t i e s  of the  bas ic  LQ compensator (which is used i n  t h e  
r e d e s i g n  procedure) are maintained. The problem is formulated i n  a proba- 
b i l i s t i c  sense t h a t  includes the e f f e c t s  of model uncer ta in ty .  I n  order  t o  
acknowledge t h e  increased  p o t e n t i a l  of having inaccura t e  models after a 
f a i l u r e  occurs. 
- 
Mathematically,  t h e  compensator redesign problem is formulated as fo l -  
lows. The magnitude of t he  r e tu rn  d i f fe rence  matrix of the  f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t  
is a measure of feedback performance. The r e tu rn  d i f f e rence  is def ined by 
D ( S )  = I + G(SI-A)-~B (2-9 1 
where s is the  Laplace transform var iab le  and G i s  the  ga in  matr ix  which 
d e f i n e s  t h e  feedback compensator which we wish t o  determine (note ,  a l l  com- 
pensa to r  dynamics such as in t eg ra to r  states are included i n  A and B). Next, 
w e  assume t h a t  some nominal compensator s a t i s f i e s  bandwidth Cons t ra in ts  of 
t h e  form 
n P( j ~ c I - ~ ) - l B o N o  B < 1 (2-10) 
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where (Ao,Bo) a r e  t he  system and c o n t r o l  matrices f o r  t h e  un fa i l ed  a i rcraf t ,  
No i s  t h e  square root  of the  inverse  of some nominal c o n t r o l  weighting matr ix  
and P i s  a bandwidth s c a l i n g  matrix. Next, w e  assume t h a t  B can be expanded 
as €3 = Bf + AB, where Bf i s  the expected value of B and where AB is a random 
m a t r i x  wi th  zero expected value and known second moments; 
(2-11) 
The opt imiza t ion  problem w e  wish t o  so lve  i s  t o  maximize t h e  expected "s ize"  
of  D ( s )  and minimize t h e  expected s i z e  of the u n c e r t a i n t y  about D ( s )  w h i l e  
ensu r ing  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  con t ro l  l a w  s a t i s f i e s  bandwidth c o n s t r a i n t s  of 
t h e  form 
where N is the 
which produces 
t h e  fo l lowing  problem. 
IP(jwcI-A)-lB~ NII < 1 (2-12) 
square roo t  of the inve r se  of t he  LQ control-weighting mat r ix  
t h e  - new c o n t r o l  l a w .  The so lu t ion ,  G, is  der ived by so lv ing  
s u b j e c t  t o  Eq. 2-12 
(2-13) 
where E(s) = NTD(s)N.  I n  [l] w e  descr ibe  how the  use  of t he  Kalman Equa l i ty ,  
2-7, t o  express  D ( s )  in terms of the  con t ro l  and state weights can be used t o  
approximately so lve  Eq. 2-13. The s o l u t i o n  is only v a l i d  f o r  reduced ef fec-  
t i v e n e s s  f a i l u r e s .  When no uncer ta in ty  i s  present ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  is t r i v i a l :  
simply so lve  the  LQ des ign  problem with the  o r i g i n a l  weight ing matrices and 





















_ _  
SECTION 3 
INTEGRATION ISSUES 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  w e  d i scuss  i ssues  assoc ia ted  with the  c rea t ion  of a 
complete  RFCS from t h e  algori thms reviewed i n  Sec t ion  2 ( robus t  f l i g h t  con- 
t r o l ,  FDI, compensator redesign and automatic t r i m ) .  These i s s u e s  can be 
roughly cha rac t e r i zed  as e i t h e r  performance o r  i n t e r f a c e  i ssues .  For t h e  
performance i s sues ,  we d i scuss  various engineering t radeof  f s t h a t  occur when 
good unfailed-performance and high degrees of f au l t - to l e rance  are des i red .  
Th i s  d i scuss ion  looks at genera l  func t iona l  requirements of r e s t r u c t u r a b l e  
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  (wi th  less regard t o  the  algorithms a l r eady  developed). 
The o v e r a l l  performance goa l  of any RFCS is the  development of a c o n t r o l  
system that allows t h e  p i l o t ,  whenever i t  is phys ica l ly  poss ib le ,  t o  ade- 
q u a t e l y  c o n t r o l  t h e  aircraft desp i t e  l a r g e  changes t o  the  dynamic inpu t lou tpu t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  and desp i t e  the presence of sometimes l a r g e  
f o r c e  and moment dis turbances.  This goa l  requi res  adequate  c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  
( i n  t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  sense) f o r  many poss ib le  f a i l u r e  modes including mul t ip l e  
s imul taneous  and s e q u e n t i a l  c o n t r o l  element f a i l u r e s  as w e l l  as f a i l u r e s  t h a t  
e f f e c t  t h e  basic aerodynamics of the a i r c r a f t .  
I n  o rde r  t o  achieve  t h i s  q u a l i t a t i v e  c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  goal ,  the  RFCS m u s t  
a lways be s t a b l e  ( t h i s  implies  nominal s t a b i l i t y  and s t a b i l i t y  robustness  f o r  
a l l  f a i l u r e  modes), should have very good d is turbance  r e j e c t i o n  p r o p e r t i e s ,  
and should at tempt  t o  maximize command following performance. Furthermore, 
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t h e s e  goa ls  m u s t  be achieved without v i o l a t i n g  the  phys ica l  c o n s t r a i n t s  on the  
aircraft .  As discussed i n  [l] and i n  Sec t ion  1, these  goals  can  be achieved 
through a combination of passive and a c t i v e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  con t ro l  func t ions .  
These funct ions are now discussed i n  d e t a i l  i n  terms of how they can be used 
t o  s a t i s f y  the o v e r a l l  RFCS performance requirements and i n  terms of t h e  
d e s i g n  i s s u e s  which need t o  be addressed f o r  each func t ion .  Four genera l  
f u n c t i o n s  are discussed.  They are: 
1. Passive Robust Feedback Compensation, 
2.  Fa i lu re  Detec t ion ,  
3 Active Cont ro l  System Reconf igu ra t ion ,  
4. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  
3 - 1 PASSIVE ROBUST FEEDBACK COMPENSATION 
Much has been s a i d  about t h i s  func t ion  i n  p a s t  r epor t s  ( s ee  [l]). Feed- 
back compensation is f requent ly  used t o  achieve command-f ollowing performance 
g o a l s  f o r  unfai led a i r c r a f t  because i t  achieves the des i r ed  performance de- 
s p i t e  “small” modeling e r r o r s  and d is turbances .  For RFCS’s, we want t o  expand 
t h i s  capab i l i t y  as much as poss ib le  without  s a c r i f i c i n g  the  s t a b i l i t y  robust-  
n e s s  of t h e  con t ro l  l a w  f o r  t he  un fa i l ed  a i rcraf t .  To achieve an expanded 
t o l e r a n c e  t o  e r r o r s  and d is turbances ,  we would l i k e  t o  raise the loop ga ins  
and d i s t r i b u t e  c o n t r o l  au tho r i ty  amongst independent c o n t r o l  elements as much 
as poss ib l e .  L imi ta t ions  exis t  because of con t ro l  element bandwidths and 
n o i s e  cons idera t ions .  
The above d i scuss ion  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the  process of c r ea t ing  a feedback 





















i s  r e a l l y  no d i f f e r e n t  i n  its goals  than  the  process of c r ea t ing  a high- 
performance mul t iva r i ab le  compensator for the  unf a i l e d  a i rcraf t .  Perhaps the  
only d i f f e r e n c e  is t h a t  one - may w i s h  to  increase  the  s t a b i l i t y  robustness  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  t o  inc lude  l a r g e r  e r r o r s  due t o  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of f a i l u r e s .  
It is t h i s  increased s t a b i l i t y  robustness s p e c i f i c a t i o n  which can  g ive  rise 
t o  a " t radeoff  between nominal performance and f a i l u r e  robustness." However, 
c losed-loop s t a b i l i t y  is  only one requirement f o r  good f a i l u r e  recovery per- 
formance. The l a r g e  loop ga ins  assoc ia ted  with a high performance compensator 
_ -  
are a l s o  important f o r  passive f a i l u r e  recovery. Therefore ,  it is more impor- 
t a n t  to  achieve nominal performance f i r s t ,  and t o  use any remaining degrees  
of  freedom i n  the  des ign  t o  increase  s t a b i l i t y  robustness  i n  t h e  presence of 
f a i l u r e s .  
The design cons ide ra t ions  discussed above, when properly addressed, can 
ach ieve  a l a r g e  degree of f a u l t  to le rance  (see, e.g., [l]). Nevertheless ,  
t h e r e  may be f a i l u r e s  which can only be handled by changing o r  reconf igur ing  
t h e  c o n t r o l  system. 
t echno log ie s  which are discussed below. 
This  process  requi res  var ious "ac t ive  f a u l t  to le rance"  
3 . 2  FAILURE DETECTION 
Clea r ly ,  i f  a c t i v e  reconf igura t ion  is necessary,  w e  must f i r s t  d e t e c t  t he  
fact  t h a t  t he  a i r c r a f t  is not opera t ing  normally. 
models of the  a i r c r a f t ,  and s i n c e  model e r r o r s  w i l l  always e x i s t ,  t he  detec-  
t i o n  system must u s e  t h e  b e s t  information while maintaining its s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  
impor tan t  f a i l u r e  modes. The important f a i l u r e  modes should be determined by 
t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of t h e  pass ive  compensator discussed above and considered 
e x p l i c i t l y  i n  the  des ign  of the  f a i l u r e  de t ec t ion  mechanism. (Note t h a t  i t  
To d e f i n e  "normal" w e  need 
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may be possible  t o  use  one d e t e c t i o n  mechanism f o r  many modes and s t i l l  main- 
t a i n  adequate  s e n s i t i v i t y .  This  is e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  types of 
c o n t r o l  element f a i l u r e s  l i k e  s tuck ,  f l o a t i n g ,  p a r t i a l l y  missing, runaway, 
etc.). Typical ly ,  i t  is believed t h a t  t h e  "s ize"  of t h e  important f a i l u r e  
modes can be much g r e a t e r  than the  s i z e  of the  modeling e r r o r  t h a t  d e f i n e s  
normal operation. Thus, i t  should be easy t o  minimize f a l s e  alarms i n  t h e  
p rocess  of detec t ing  important f a i l u r e s .  
._ 
I n  addi t ion  t o  d e t e c t i n g  important f a i l u r e s  e x p l i c i t l y ,  i t  may a l s o  be 
d e s i r a b l e  t o  de t ec t  o t h e r  unant ic ipa ted  f a i l u r e s .  Generic de t ec t ion  tests 
which use  a l l  information (an a i r c r a f t  model) t o  i ts  f u l l e s t  are appropr i a t e  
f o r  t h i s  funct ion;  however, care must be taken t o  avoid f a l s e  alarms. 
Note t h a t  w e  have not considered any form of f a i l u r e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i n  
t h i s  process.  This  is  because t h e  requirements of t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  func t ion  
are dependent on t h e  a c t i v e  reconf igura t ion  s t r a t e g y  which is  discussed next. 
3 e 3  ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEM RECONFIGURATION 
The purpose of t h i s  func t ion  is  t o  "reoptimize" t h e  performance of t he  
c o n t r o l  system for t h e  new f a i l u r e  condi t ions.  This  reoptimized performance 
i n c l u d e s  the  need t o  reject d is turbances  due t o  the  f a i l u r e ,  recover command 
fo l lowing  as much as poss ib le ,  and ensure  closed-loop s t a b i l i t y  ( s t a b i l i t y  
robus tness )  . 
In order  to  perform t h i s  reopt imizat ion,  any reconf igura t ion  s t r a t e g y  
r e q u i r e s  some knowledge about t he  f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t .  More (and more a c c u r a t e )  
in format ion  w i l l  a l low any reconf i g u r a t i o n  s t r a t e g y  t o  b e t t e r  reopt imize air- 
c r a f t  performance i n  the  presence of f a i l u r e s .  For example, i f  w e  knew only 







































inducing  no d i s tu rbances  on the a i r c r a f t ,  then the technique of s imultaneous 
s t a b i l i z a t i o n ,  [ 8 ] ,  might be an appropriate  reconf igura t ion  s t r a t egy .  Th i s  
s t r a t e g y  would ensure  closed-loop s t a b i l i t y  but does nothing t o  opt imize com- 
mand fol lowing o r  d i s turbance  r e j ec t ion  performance. As another  example, i f  
a s i n g l e  c o n t r o l  w a s  s tuck  a t  a known pos i t ion ,  t he  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h a t  con- 
t r o l  w a s  known, 'and a l l  con t ro l s  had equivalent  bandwidths, then a mixer-l ike 
s t r a t e g y ,  [ 9 ] ,  might be appropr ia te  s i n c e  i t  can recover  the  map from t h e  
u n f a i l e d  c o n t r o l  element commands t o  t h e  forces  and moments. 
The LQ compensator redesign procedure and feedforward t r i m  of [l] r e q u i r e s  
some knowledge of both c o n t r o l  e f fec t iveness  and d is turbances .  More Spec i f ic -  
a l l y ,  t hese  procedures are implemented using estimates of t he  f a i l e d  a i r c r a f  t s  
l i n e a r i z e d  dynamics inc luding  est imates  of uncer ta in ty .  Since t h i s  informa- 
t i o n  covers  near ly  a l l  f a i l u r e  modes, the performance of t h i s  s t r a t e g y  is only 
dependent on t h e  q u a l i t y  of the estimates of the  requi red  information. The 
problem of providing accu ra t e  information i s  addressed i n  t h e  fol lowing iden- 
t i f  i c a t i o n  funct ion.  
3 - 4  IDENTIFICATION 
I n  genera l ,  t h e  ques t ion  of what must be i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  adequate recon- 
f i g u r a t i o n  performance i s  s t i l l  an open one. A s  d i scussed  above, t h e  most 
g e n e r a l  information might cons i s t  of t he  s e l e c t i o n  of an  opera t ing  p o i n t  and 
t h e  de te rmina t ion  of t he  f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t ' s  l i nea r i zed  dynamics ( inc lud ing  
measurable/est imable  po r t ion  of dis turbances) .  The most important p i eces  of 
i n fo rma t ion  f o r  any s t r a t e g y ,  however, are the  f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t s '  c o n t r o l  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s e s  and a n  estimate of t he  dis turbances.  This  is because f a i l -  
u r e s  of c o n t r o l  e l e m e n t s  can cause l a rge  d is turbances ,  and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  
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of c o n t r o l  au tho r i ty  i s  only poss ib le  when the  remaining au tho r i ty  i s  known. 
The f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t ' s  s t a b i l i t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  ( i f  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  
u n f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t )  may be important i n  some cases, although t h i s  has not 
been inves t iga ted .  
I n  o rde r  to  maximize the q u a l i t y  of the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  procedure, i t  
i s  t y p i c a l l y  necessary t o  "focus" t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  algori thm on t h e  most 
impor tan t  parameters f o r  the  p a r t i c u l a r  f a i l u r e  mode. Focusing is important 
because it allows only t h e  bes t  information (i.e., that with the l a r g e s t  
signal-to-noise r a t i o )  t o  be se lec ted .  For example, i f  it is known t h a t  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  con t ro l  element is stuck a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  p o s i t i o n  and t h a t  no o the r  
f a i l u r e s  have occurred,  then the e s t ima t ion  of t h e  d is turbance  caused by t h i s  
f a i l u r e  is t r i v i a l  (see Sect ion 5). S imi la r ly ,  i f  an aircraf t  path f a i l u r e  
(e .g . ,  p a r t i a l l y  missing, etc.) can be i s o l a t e d  t o  a s i n g l e  con t ro l  e lement ,  
t h e n  t h e  j o i n t  e s t ima t ion  of a l l  c o n t r o l  e f f ec t ivenesses  would not be neces- 
s a r y  and t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  procedure could focus on only the f a i l e d  con t ro l .  
Because focusing can be extremely important f o r  i d e n t i f  i c a t i o n  proce- 
d u r e s ,  we see t h a t  a f i r s t  s t e p  in i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  is t y p i c a l l y  the  i s o l a t i o n  
of f a i l u r e  modes. The i s o l a t i o n  process  answers the  quest ion Which f a i l u r e  
mode occurred? The remaining s t e p  i s  one of e s t ima t ion  which then provides  
t h e  d e t a i l e d  jlnformation needed f o r  a reconf igura t ion  s t r a t egy .  An open ques- 
t i o n  i s  t h e  determinat ion of what l e v e l  of i s o l a t i o n  is  needed t o  o b t a i n  the  
focus ing  necessary t o  provide q u a l i t y  estimates. 
F i n a l l y ,  a l though focusing of es t imat ion  a lgor i thms on important param- 
eters is  important, i t  w i l l  only al low the  bes t  e x t r a c t i o n  of the information 
tha t  is avai lab le .  If t h i s  information is of low q u a l i t y ,  then estimates w i l l  






















e n s u r e  good s ignal- to-noise  ratios i n  t h e  s igna l s  being used for es t imat ion .  
The only  way t h i s  can  be done i s  through the a p p l i c a t i o n  of known c o n t r o l  
- 
"probes"  or ( d i t h e r - l i k e  s igna l s ) .  These probes only need t o  be a c t i v e  during 
a b r i e f  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  period following a f a i l u r e  and would not i n t e r f e r e  
w i t h  normal f l i g h t .  Furthermore, these probes can be designed t o  have minimal 
impact  on the  a i r c r a f t  while enhancing the  d i s t i n g u i s h a b i l i t y  of f a i l u r e s  and 
improve e s t ima t ion  performance. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
The four  basic func t ions  needed t o  achieve high degrees of f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
c o n t r o l  are 
1. Feedback compensation during normal f l i g h t ,  
2 .  F a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n ,  
3. Control  system redesign procedures, and 
4 .  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  
Each of these func t ions  should be designed with t h e  fol lowing concerns. 
FEEDBACK 
1 -  
2. 
3.  
4 .  
COW E NSAT IO N 
I f  the mminal  conpensator has high loop-gains at low frequen- 
cies, then  i t  w i l l  be ab le  t o  pass ive ly  accommodate many f o r c e  
and moment imbalances due to  f a i l u r e s .  
High loop-gains, however, may reduce s t a b i l i t y  robustness i n  t h e  
f a c e  of f a i l u r e s .  However, t h i s  may not be important i f  detec- 
t i o n ,  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  and compensator redes ign  r e s u l t s  i n  a 
robus t ly  s t a b l e  a i r c r a f t .  
I f  t h e  compensator can passively accommodate "large" f a i l u r e s ,  
t hen  f a i l u r e  de t ec t ion  thresholds  can be set t o  values  t h a t  sig- 
n i f i c a n t l y  reduce f a l s e  alarms. Thus, it is  important t o  char- 
a c t e r i z e  t h e  passive f au l t - to l e rance  of t h e  nominal compensator - 
I f  t he  f a i l u r e  de t ec t ion  system cannot d e t e c t  some f a i l u r e s  with- 
ou t  s a c r i f i c i n g  false-alarm performance, then  t h e  nominal compen- 
s a t o r  should be designed to pass ive ly  accommodate those f a i l u r e s .  
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CONTROL SYSTEM REDESIGN 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4 .  
5. 
6 .  
7. 
The redesigned feedback compensator must ensure  s t a b i l i t y  and 
optimize d is turbance  r e j e c t i o n  and command following performance 
without v i o l a t i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l  bandwidths t h a t  guarantee s t a b i l i t y  
robustness. 
To maximize performance, d e t a i l s  of t h e  f a i l u r e  condi t ion  are 
needed. 
t i o n  procedures, on-line redes ign  i s  important. 
Since many d e t a i l s  are only a v a i l a b l e  from i d e n t i f i c a -  
Feedforward compensation (such as automatic t r i m )  can be very 
usefu l  i n  r e j e c t i n g  measurable disturbances.  However, over ly  
r e s t r i c t i v e  requirements (e.g., recover a l l  f o r c e s  and moments 
as i n  t h e  mixer approach) can  lead t o  contro1:saturation. 
When no f a i l u r e  e x i s t s ,  t h e  redesigned c o n t r o l  l a w  should 
recover t h e  nominal c o n t r o l l e r  i n  order  t o  minimize t r a n s i e n t s  
due t o  f a l s e  alarms i n  which i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  r e t u r n s  values c l o s e  
t o  the u n f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t .  
Assessment of t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of redesigned c o n t r o l  l a w s  d e f i n e s  
t h e  o v e r a l l  l i m i t a t i o n s  of the  RFCS. These l i m i t a t i o n s  can only 
be overcome by more " inherent  redundancy." 
Since i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  procedures conta in  inaccurac i e s ,  t he  r edes ign  
procedures should inco rpora t e  measures of unce r t a in ty  about the 
parameters t h a t  d r ive  t h e  redesign. 
The s e l e c t i o n  of a des i r ed  pos t - f a i lu re  ope ra t ing  poin t  can have 
a large i m p a c t  on t he  RFCS's a b i l i t y  t o  recover from l a r g e  
failures. 
IDENTIFICATION 
1. Better estimates of cri t ical  parameters can be obtained i f  iden- 
t i f i c a t i o n  algorithms are focused. One method of focusing i s  t o  
" i s o l a t e "  the cause of an important f a i l u r e ,  and then i d e n t i f y  
only t h e  r e l evan t  parameters. 
2. Estimates of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  accuracy are needed s i n c e  the  redes ign  
procedure can  maximize robustness i f  t h i s  estimate is ava i l ab le .  
3. Estimation of pos t - f a i lu re  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  is  the  most important 
aspect of i d e n t i f i c a t l o n  s i n c e  i t  impacts how con t ro l  power can be 
r e d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  t h e  redesigned c o n t r o l  l a w .  
4 .  Probe or d i t h e r  s i g n a l s  can be use fu l  in improving i d e n t i f i c a -  
t i o n  accuracy. This c a n  be done without a f f e c t i n g  t h e  o v e r a l l  
s t a b i l i t y  of t he  un fa i l ed  aircraft  s i n c e  t h e s e  s i g n a l s  only need 
t o  be app l i ed  a f t e r  a f a i l u r e  i s  de tec ted .  
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The i s s u e s  d iscussed  above are considered t o  be those  t h a t  are most 
impor t an t  i n  the  development of a n  in tegra ted  RFCS i n  which the  c a p a b i l i t i e s  
and l i m i t a t i o n s  of each p a r t  of t h e  RFCS a r e  complemented by o thers .  Fur ther  
work i n  i n t e g r a t e d  RFCS des ign  should include design and a n a l y s i s  methods t h a t  
e n s u r e  such complimentary func t iona l i t y .  T h i s  is the  only way t o  ensure  and 
j u s t i f y  t h e  high degree  of f a u l t  to le rance  t h a t  is claimed f o r  r e s t r u c t u r a b l e  
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  systems. 
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INTERFACE I S  SUES 
The i n t e r f a c e  i s s u e s  t h a t  a r e  discussed i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  are unique t o  
t h e  d e t a i l s  of t he  algori thms t h a t  are  being in t eg ra t ed .  Methods f o r  dea l ing  -- 
w i t h  "mismatching" i n t e r f a c e s  a r e  derived and a d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  top-level  
c o n t r o l - l o g i c  f o r  t h e  demonstration system is developed. 
o p e r a t i o n  is  der ived  as a consequence of s p e c i f i c  assumptions about d e t e c t a b l e  
and i s o l a t a b l e  f a i l u r e s  and the  expected r e s u l t s  of reconf igura t ion .  
Much of t he  top-level 
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  i n t e g r a t i o n  issues ,  the  i n t e r f a c e  problem is  p a r t i c u l a r  
t o  t h e  a lgor i thms t h a t  are being used f o r  t h i s  p ro jec t .  The th ree  bas i c  func- -. . .  
t i o n a l  blocks (FDI, ARM, and FCS; see Fig. 2-1) each have d a t a  input  require-  
ments and output  c a p a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  were derived somewhat independently. The 
r e s u l t  w a s  a mismatch between the  data  t h a t  the  FDI a lgor i thm n a t u r a l l y  pro- 
vides and the  informat ion  requireiiients af the A%Y. 
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  FDI algorithm only provides "d i sc re t e"  information 
abou t  f a i l u r e s  such as what f a i l u r e s  have caused t r i g g e r s  , what f a i l u r e s  
cou ld  be v e r i f i e d  and which f a i l u r e s  are more l i k e l y  than o thers  ( see  [5] ) . 
When appropr i a t e ,  f l a g s  a r e  set t o  ind ica t e  t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  con t ro l  element 
f a i l u r e  has  been de tec t ed  and i so la ted  o r  t h a t  a f a l s e  t r i g g e r  has occurred. 
Unfo r tuna te ly ,  t h e  automatic redesign module ( t r i m  and compensator redes ign)  
needs a d i f f e r e n t  set of information. The ARM module is based on t he  assump- 
t i o n  t h a t ,  a f t e r  a f a i l u r e  occurs,  the FDI s y s t e m  w i l l  provide an e s t ima te  of 
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t h e  l i n e a r  dynamics of the  a i r c r a f t  (at some des i red  f l i g h t  cond i t ion ) ,  an  
estimate of any s i g n i f i c a n t  observable d is turbances ,  and some c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
of t h e  uncer ta in ty  of these estimates. 
NOTAT I ON 
f ( + )  = 
Uncertainty Tensor (see Sect ion 2) 
Unfailed Effec t iveness  Matrix 
Disturbance Vector (see Sec t ion  2) 
i , j - t h  Element of Matrix X 
Expected Value of Fa i l ed  Effec t iveness  Matrix (see Sec t ion  2) 
Effec t iveness  of Control  j 
Expected Value 
i - th  Column of Bf 
Measured Value of i - th  Control "Posi t ion" 
T r i m  Value of i - th  Control  f o r  t h e  Desired Pos t - f a i l  
Operat ing Point  
Condi t ional  P robab i l i t y  Di s t r ibu t ion  Function 
Confusion Set 
Dirac Delta Function 
Variance of E j  
P robab i l i t y  of "Only the  j- th Fai lure"  Being True 
Since the FDI a lgor i thm is only concerned with c o n t r o l  element f a i l u r e s ,  
any s t a b i l i t y  e f f e c t s  due t o  f a i l u r e s  atust be ignored. Therefore,  t he  state 
t r a n s i t i o n  matrix (A) f o r  the  f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t  w i l l  be i d e n t i c a l  t o  i t s  va lue  
f o r  t h e  unfai led a i r c r a f t  and w i l l  be s to red  as d a t a  f o r  the  ARM. Note t h a t  
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t h e  va lue  of A t h a t  is  used i n  the  ARM represents  t he  l i n e a r  dynamics of t h e  
u n f a i l e d  a i rcraf t  about any des i r ed  opera t ing  poin t  and need not correspond 
t o  t h e  opera t ing  po in t  of the a i r c r a f t  j u s t  p r i o r  t o  reconfigurat ion.  
S i m i l a r l y ,  the  elements of matrix Bf corresponding t o  unfa i led  c o n t r o l  
e l emen t s  w i l l  be der ived  from the  unfa i led  l i n e a r  dynamics a t  the  d e s i r e d  
o p e r a t i n g  point .  
The unce r t a in ty  cha rac t e r i za t ion  descr ibed i n  Sec t ion  2 (see [l] f o r  more _ _  
d e t a i l s )  i s  a f o u r t h  order  tensor  involving t h e  cross-covariances of elements 
i n  t h e  unce r t a in ty  mat r ix  AB. 
z e r o  when j f II (i-e.,  the  e f f ec t iveness  es t imat ion  errors f o r  d i f f e r e n t  con- 
t r o l s  are uncorre la ted)  and use t h e  m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  model 
For  s impl i c i ty ,  we w i l l  assume t h a t  f3ijka is  
[ B l i j  
where Ej is a random va r i ab le  represent ing the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t he  j - th  
c o n t r o l .  Thus, s i n c e  Bf is t he  expected value of B, (see Sect ion 2) ,  





B i j k j  = [Bo l i j  [Bolkj  a j  
where a j  is the  s tandard  dev ia t ion  of E j  and would t y p i c a l l y  take on va lues  
between ze ro  (no unce r t a in ty )  and one (100 percent  unce r t a in ty ) ,  a l though 
v a l u e s  exceeding one are not excluded. 
4.1 ACTUATOR-PATH FAILURES 
The FDI system has the capab i l i t y  of de tec t ing  and i s o l a t i n g  mul t ip l e  
s imul taneous  and sequen t i a l  actuator-path f a i l u r e s .  When ac tua tor  f a i l u r e s  
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are de tec t ed  and v e r i f i e d ,  reasonable values fo r  B, wp, and aj can  be de t e r -  
mined by r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  models described i n  Sec t ion  2.  These models I 
I 
I 
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  most f a i l u r e s  r e s u l t  i n  zero au tho r i ty  and t h a t  t he  d i s tu rbances  
are governed by t h e  a c t u a l  pos i t i on  of the con t ro l  element. Therefore ,  a wide 
range of ac tua tor  f a i l u r e s  can be adequately handled by zeroing t h e  column of 
t h e  expected con t ro l  e f f ec t iveness  matr ix  ( B f )  corresponding t o  f a i l e d  actu-  
a t o r s ,  and es t imat ing  the  observable dis turbances by 
- 1 bi f (6i - 6Erim) wP - 
i E  {Fai led Actuators} 
Although o r i g i n a l l y  conceived f o r  s tuck  sur faces  i n  
4-1 c a n  be executed at  every t i m e  ins tance  i n  order  
(4-4) 
which wp is cons t an t ,  Eq. 
t o  allow t he  t r i m  a lgo-  
r i t h m  t o  properly handle f l o a t i n g  and runaway f a i l u r e s .  Also, note  t h a t  by 
z e r o i n g  t h e  columns of B corresponding t o  v e r i f i e d  a c t u a t o r  f a i l u e s ,  t h e  ARM 
w i l l  e l imina te  t h e i r  use i n  any reconfigured con t ro l  l a w .  Thus, t h e  va lues  
a s s igned  to t h e  unce r t a in ty  parameters, aj, is  immaterial and can be l e f t  at 
i t s  d e f a u l t  (no- fa i l )  value ( t y p i c a l l y  zero) .  
The FDI s y s t e m  a l s o  has the capab i l i t y  t o  i n d i c a t e  when an  a c t u a t o r  
f a i l u r e  is suspected, but not c l e a r l y  ve r i f i ed .  Since the  ARM is  capable  of 
d e a l i n g  wi th  unce r t a in ty ,  i t  is  s u p e r f i c i a l l y  a t t r a c t i v e  t o  consider  t h e  pos- 
s i b i l i t y  of u t i l i z i n g  t h e  compensator redesign algori thm as an  i n t e r i m  means 
of providing f a u l t  t o l e rance  between the  t i m e  t h a t  a f a i l u r e  has t r i g g e r e d  
and i t  is ve r i f i ed .  There are two drawbacks t o  t h i s  idea ,  however. F i r s t ,  
t h e  FDI system i s  capable  of i den t i fy ing  f a l s e  t r i g g e r s  by f a i l i n g  to v e r i f y  
a f a i l u r e  af ter  i t  has  been t r iggered .  In t h i s  case, the  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  a n  
































is  i d e n t i f i e d  could create undesirable t r a n s i e n t  c o n t r o l  de f l ec t ions .  The 
second drawback t o  t h i s  idea l i e s  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t he  use of a redesigned 
compensator w i l l  tend t o  de-emphasize the  use of t he  suspected c o n t r o l  ele- 
ment. This  decreased use can frequent ly  r e s u l t  i n  smaller f a i l u r e  s i g n a t u r e s  
( r e f e r  t o  the  f a i l u r e  models) and possibly cause f a l s e  t r i g g e r  i nd ica t ions .  
The o v e r a l l  r e s u l t  could then be a l i m i t  cycle  of ga in  t r a n s i t i o n s  caused by 
r e p e a t e d  t r i g g e r s  and f a l se - t r igge r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s .  Since t h e  ac tua tor -pa th  
system is capable of de t ec t ing  f a i l u r e s  i n  a very s h o r t  period of t i m e  (under 
.- 
one second) t h e  lack  of an in t e r im  robust con t ro l  l a w  during per iods of sus- 
pec ted  a c t u a t o r  f a i l u r e s  w i l l  not severly impact  o v e r a l l  a i r c r a f t  performance. 
The problems c i t e d  above are then avoided by u t i l i z i n g  only the  o r i g i n a l  con- 
t r o l  l a w  . u n t i l  an  a c t u a t o r  f a i l u r e  is t r iggered  and ve r i f i ed .  
4.2 AIRCRAFT-PATH FAILURES 
The f i r s t  t h ing  t o  recognize i n  transforming a i r c ra f t -pa th  FI)I informa- 
t i o n  i n t o  values  of Bf,  wp, and aj, is t h a t ,  (un l ike  the  ac tua to r  case) t h e r e  
is no d i r e c t l y  measurable dis turbance (w,) es t imate .  
f a i l u r e  modes presented i n  Sec t ion  2 have no r e s u l t i n g  d is turbance  a s soc ia t ed  
Since most of t he  l i k e l y  
w i t h  them, we will assume t h a t  a i r c ra f t -pa th  f a i l u r e s  as a whole have t h i s  
p rope r ty .  As a r e s u l t ,  t he  t r i m  algorithm w i l l  not be executed f o r  a i r c r a f t -  
p a t h  f a i l u r e s .  Those f a i l u r e  modes t h a t '  do have s i g n i f i c a n t  d i s turbances  
(e .g . ,  runaway or s tuck  off-center)  may, therefore ,  be problematic f o r  t h i s  
system. 
I n  developing values  f o r  Bf and a, it is use fu l  t o  recognize t h e  fou r  
b a s i c  events  t h a t  t h e  a i r c ra f t -pa th  FDI system can create. They are, 
1. A s i n g l e  c o n t r o l  element f a i l u r e  i s  i s o l a t e d ,  
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2 -  A t r i g g e r  occurred,  but all ver i fy  t e s t s  f a i l ,  i n d i c a t i n g  
a f a l s e  t r i g g e r ,  
3. A t r i g g e r  occurred,  some v e r i f y  t e s t s  passed, but, t he  i s o l a t i o n  
tes t  r e s u l t s  preclude i s o l a t i o n  of a s i n g l e  c o n t r o l  (unable- 
to-decide) , and 
A t r i g g e r  occurred,  but states 1, 2 ,  o r  3 have - ye t  t o  be dec lared .  4 .  
Event number 4 i s  similar t o  the “ t r iggered  but not  ye t  v e r i f i e d ”  actua-  
t o r  case discussed above. 
s a t o r  i n  this  state are equal ly  va l id  here. 
no th ing .  
The arguments fo r  u t i l i z i n g  t h e  o r i g i n a l  compen- 
Thus state 4 is handled by doing 
Event number 3 (unable-to-decide) could occur e i t h e r  due t o  l a r g e r  t han  
a n t i c i p a t e d  model e r r o r  e f f e c t s ,  o r  due t o  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t h e  s i z e  of 
a f a i l u r e  s igna tu re  precludes the r e l i a b l e  i s o l a t i o n  of two o r  more c o n t r o l  
e lements .  The f i r s t  s i t u a t i o n  would i n d i c a t e  t reatment  of event 3 as a f a l s e  
t r i g g e r  as appropr ia te .  I n  the  lat ter s i t u a t i o n ,  however, s u b s t a n t i a l  amounts 
of t i m e  might e l a p s e  before  a co r rec t  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the  f a i l e d  c o n t r o l  can 
be made (cor rec t  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  will never be made i f  f a i l u r e s  are i n d i s t i n -  
gu i shab le ) .  Trea t ing  event  3 as a f a l s e  t r i g g e r  i n  t h i s  case could t h e r e f o r e  
be de t r imen ta l  to  f a i l u r e  recovery. Thus, compensator redesign should t ake  
p l a c e  when event 3 is declared.  
Event number 2 f requent ly  occurs when no f a i l u r e  is  present  and t h e r e f o r e  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a r e t u r n  t o  a con t ro l  l a w  t ha t  assumes t h a t  t he re  is no aircraft- 
p a t h  f a i l u r e  is appropr i a t e  (a “ re turn“  i s  necessary only i f  event 3 occurred  
p rev ious ly ;  the occurrence of event 2 suggests  t h a t  t h e  previous s ta te -3  
occurrence  was t o  t o  model e r r o r ) .  
F i n a l l y ,  i n  Event 1, when a s i n g l e  cont ro l  can be i s o l a t e d  as f a i l e d ,  an 
estimate of Bf and aj t h a t  somehow r e f l e c t s  the unce r t a in ty  about t h e  post-  





















CONFUSION SET CREATION (EVENT 3) 
The idea  behind forming a confusion s e t  comes from two aspec t s  of t h e  FDI 
system. F i r s t ,  i n  t h e  design of the a i r c ra f t -pa th  FDI system, i t  is poss ib l e  
t o  i d e n t i f y  c o n t r o l  elements t h a t  can not be i s o l a t e d  from each o ther .  I n  
t h i s  case, i t  is t y p i c a l  t o  t reat  all i nd i s t ingu i shab le  con t ro l s  as a s i n g l e  
f i c t i t i o u s  c o n t r o l  t h a t  will be de tec ted  and i s o l a t e d  upon the  occurrence of 
any c o n t r o l  f a i l u r e s  wi th in  the  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b i l i t y  o r  "confusion" set. The 
737 a p p l i c a t i o n  presented i n  Section 5,  i n  f a c t ,  has such a s i t u a t i o n .  Force 
._ 
and moment imbalances by themselves are not s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  
same-side e l e v a t o r  and s t a b i l i z e r  cont ro ls  and are t h e r e f o r e  t r e a t e d  as single 
" h o r i z o n t a l - t a i l "  c o n t r o l s  ( l e f t  and r i g h t )  i n  t h e  FDI a lgor i thm (51. I n  t h e  
demo RFCS system developed for this p ro jec t ,  modi f ica t ions  to t he  FDI d e c i s i o n  
l o g i c  were made so t h a t  the  i s o l a t i o n  of a hor i zon ta l  t a i l  f a i l u r e  would 
r e s u l t  i n  event  3 w i t h  t h e  only undecidable "test" being a f i c t i t i o u s  e l e v a t o r  
v e r s u s  s t ab i l i ze r  test. 
The second mot iva t ion  for a confusion set is due t o  the  occurrence of 
e v e n t  3 when margina l ly  i s o l a t a b l e  f a i l u r e s  are present .  Recall t h a t  i n  
evei l t  3 some o r  a l l  of t h e  verify tes ts  m y  hive passed hut no unanimous ver- 
d i c t  (dec la r ing  a s i n g l e  con t ro l  t o  be f a i l e d )  can be reached. When t h i s  
o c c u r s ,  we would l ike  t o  examine the v e r i f y  and i s o l a t e  t es t  r e s u l t s  t o  de te r -  
mine what subse t  of f a i l u r e s  could be indicated.  
We approach t h e  development of t h i s  set by determining t h e  f a i l u r e s  which 
are ru l ed  ou t  of cons idera t ion .  F i r s t  recall t h a t  each sequen t i a l  ( v e r i f y  and 
i s o l a t e  test) can be i n  one of three s i t u a t i o n s  when event  3 occurs .  Each 
s e q u e n t i a l  test s ta t i s t ic  could have crossed i t s  p o s i t i v e  threshold ,  i ts nega- 
t i v e  threshold  o r  be i n  between 151. When a v e r i f y  s t a t i s t i c  c rosses  i t s  
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nega t ive  threshold,  t h e r e  is a clear ind ica t ion  t h a t  t h e  corresponding f a i l u r e  
shou ld  not  be considered as p a r t  of t h e  confusion set. Conversely, when it  
h a s  c rossed  i t s  p o s i t i v e  threshold,  t h e r e  is ,  as ye t ,  no reason t o  r u l e  t h a t  
c o n t r o l  ou t  of t h e  confusion set. When t h e  v e r i f y  test s t a t i s t i c  is  i n  
between, t h e  s i t u a t i o n  is not as c lea r .  However, the  o r i g i n a l  da t a  s t ruc -  
t u r e s  of t h e  FDI a lgor i thm did not permit d i s t i ngu i sh ing  t h i s  case from t h e  
case where i t  crossed the  negative threshold ,  thus we e l imina te  both " f a i l e d  
v e r i f y "  and "unverified" con t ro l s  from t h e  confusion set. 
_ _  
The i s o l a t i o n  tes t  r e s u l t s  are a l s o  used i n  the  formation of a confusion 
s e t  when event  3 occurs .  To rule out  a c o n t r o l  from t h i s  set on t he  b a s i s  of 
i s o l a t i o n  r e s u l t s ,  we r equ i r e  t h a t  some i s o l a t i o n  test c l e a r l y  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
t h e  c o n t r o l  to be ru l ed  out  is less l i k e l y  than another  cont ro l .  That i s ,  fo r  
eve ry  i s o l a t i o n  test t h a t  c rosses  i t s  p o s i t i v e  or nega t ive  threshold before  
e v e n t  3 occurs ,  the c o n t r o l  which is contra- indicated is ruled out  of t h e  
confus ion  set. 
Thus, t he  confusion set cons i s t s  of those c o n t r o l s  t h a t  have been ver i -  
f i e d ,  have been found t o  be more l i k e l y  than another  con t ro l ,  or  have been 
Involved  i n  i s o l a t i o n  tests which are unable t o  decide,  but have not been 
found t o  be less l i k e l y  than another  con t ro l .  This procedure produces the  
d e s i r e d  r e s u l t  i n  p ro to typ ica l  cases (e.g., two c o n t r o l s  are more l i k e l y  
t h a n  a l l  o thers ,  but  the  t e s t  d i s t i ngu i sh ing  these  two is  unable t o  dec ide) .  
However, o the r  i n t e r e s t i n g  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  confusion sets arise. One pos- 
s i b l i t y  is  tha t  an empty confusion set could be c rea ted .  Using the no ta t ion ,  
a > b t o  imply t h a t  t h e  i s o l a t i o n  test  between a and b decides  i n  favor  of 
a,  w e  would get an empty confusion set with,  say a, b, c v e r i f i e d  and a > b, 
b > c ,  and c > a. While t h i s  should not physical ly  occur ( e spec ia l ly  when 
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a ,  b, o r  c is a c t u a l l y  f a i l e d )  t he re  is no numerical guarantee t h a t  it w i l l  
no t  occur.  I n  the  demo RFCS such a s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  be t r e a t e d  the  same as 
even t  2 .  Another property of t h i s  procedure is t h a t  a confusion s e t  of s i z e  1 
occur s  when a unanimous ve rd ic t  is present.  This is a pleasing r e s u l t  s i n c e  
i t  was our o r i g i n a l  requirement t h a t  i s o l a t i o n  t o  a s i n g l e  con t ro l  would be 
dec la red  when a unanimous ve rd ic t  was reached. However, it is a l so  p o s s i b l e  
f o r  a confusion set of s i z e  1 t o  occur without a unanimous verd ic t .  For 
example, a t h r e e  c o n t r o l  (a, b, and c) s i t u a t i o n  i n  which only a is v e r i f i e d  
and a > b, but a vs c i s  unable t o  decide, will r e s u l t  i n  a confusion set con- 
s i s t i n g  of only a. This is an  i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t  t h a t  sometimes makes sense ,  
b u t  has  not been deeply explored i n  terms of consis tency with a c t u a l  phys i ca l  
f a i l u r e  scena r ios -  Note, however, t ha t  t he  dec is ion  l o g i c  implied by the 
confus ion  set would impact  t he  FDI  performance r e s u l t s  reported i n  [ 5 ] .  
- 
_ _  
CREATING Bf AND a j  FOR EVENT 3 
Having developed a confusion s e t  cons i s t ing  of a l l  poss ib le  sources  of 
f a i l u r e  when no unanimous dec is ion  can be reached ( f o r  a s i n g l e  con t ro l  o r  
f o r  a f a l s e - t r i g g e r ) ,  we now present two methods f o r  t r a n s l a t i n g  t h i s  type  of 
u n c e r t a i n t y  i n t o  va lues  of Bf and aj needed f o r  t he  ARM. 
Using the  model of Eq. 4-1, we see t h a t  we need to transform the  confu- 
s i o n  set i n t o  a p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  fo r  a l l  t he  Ej. 
Method 1 
L e t ,  
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It is then possible  t o  show tha t  
I 
1 
E { E j (  j#C) = 1 
and 
( 4-9 1 
.. 
I n  t h e  above, p j  r ep resen t s  t he  p robab i l i t y  the  "event" ( E j  = 0 and E i  = 1, 
(i+j)) .  Thus, some measure of t he  magnitude of the  r e l a t i v e  l ike l ihoods  of 
each f a i l u r e  i s  des i r ab le .  While such measures are computable wi th in  t h e  FDI 
system, it is f e l t  t h a t  t he  e x t r a  e f f o r t  i n  such computations is not worth- 
while  and we w i l l  use p j  = pcn-1 f o r  a l l  j i n  C (ncn denotes  c a r d i n a l i t y  or 
number of members i n  the  set, C).  
Example 
P i  = probab i l i t y  t h a t  E i  = 0, E j  = 1, j# i  wi th  i , j  i n  {1,2,3).  
E{E:) = p1 02 + p2 12 + p3 12 = 1 - PI 
Var(E1) = a: = ( l -p1)  - (1-p1I2 = P l ( l - P l )  







































L e t  f ( E j 1  j I# C) be as i n  Eq. 4-5 and 
where P,(Ej) i s  a uniform dens i ty  on t h e  i n t e r v a l  [0,1].  





Again, P j  r e p r e s e n t s  the  l ike l ihood t h a t  the  j- th c o n t r o l  has f a i l e d .  
i n  t h i s  method, we assume t h a t  E j  is  uniformly d i s t r i b u t e d  on [0,1] under  
t h e  hypothes is  t h a t  j has f a i l e d  and t h a t  i t  is  equal  t o  1 under a l l  o t h e r  
hypo theses 
However, 
SUMAWRY OF A I R C m - P A T H  INTERFACE 
The demo system t o  be described i n  Sec t ion  5 employs the  fol lowing l o g i c  
upon t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the  four  FDI events  descr ibed above (a d e t a i l e d  
d e s c r i p t i o n  of t he  sof tware implementation is given in [ lo] ) .  
Event 1 Use Eqs. 4-2, 4-3, and 4-7, 4-12, 4-13 wi th  p j  = 1, where 
j i s  t h e  index associated with the  i s o l a t e d  cont ro l .  
Event 2 Return ( i f  event 3 previously declared;  otherwise,  no 
r e t u r n  necessary) t o  t h e  nominal (un fa i l ed )  compensator 
when the re  a r e  no ac tua tor  f a i l u r e s .  When ac tua to r  
4 3  
f a i l u r e s  are present ,  r e t u r n  t o  a, Bf va lues  set by 
a c t u a t o r  f a i l u r e  de tec t ion .  
- 
Event 3 Use Eqs. 4-2, 4-3, and 4-7, 4-8, 4-9 w i t h  p j  = ncn-1 . 
Event 4 Make no change t o  the  compensator. 
4 . 3  OVERALL RFCS OPERATION 
_ _  This  subsect ion puts  together  t h e  concepts d i scussed  thus fa r  and f u l l y  
d e s c r i b e s  t h e  func t iona l  opera t ion  of t h e  o v e r a l l  RFCS developed f o r  t h i s  
p r o j e c t .  Deta i l s  of the  software implementation are provided i n  [ lo].  
F igu re  4-1 p r e s e n t s  a s ta te  t r a n s i t i o n  diagram (or f i n i t e - s t a t e  machine 
d e s c r i p t i o n )  fo r  t h e  o v e r a l l  RFCS algorithm. In t h i s  f i g u r e ,  there  are e i g h t  
t y p e s  of events t h a t  cause t r a n s i t i o n s  and two d i s t i n c t  types of states. The 
two types  of states represent :  
1. FCS opera t iona l  states labe led  Fo, F', F* ', and F' * * ; S t a t e  Fo 
a l w a y s  corresponds t o  the  base l ine  o r  nominal f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
l a w  (gains  and t r i m  values) ;  S t a t e s  F' , F' ' , and F* correspond 
t o  gains and t r i m  values  t h a t  have been redesigned. 
2 .  Reconfiguration-method states labe led  AI, A2, A3, 4; i n  each 
of t h e s e  states, the ARM parameters (Bf , a ,wp)  are updated (d i f -  
f e r e n t l y  f o r  each s ta te)  and t h e  compensator redesign and/or 
auto- t r im algori thms are executed. 
The system always starts i n  Fo. The state t r a n s i t i o n s  are due t o  seven FDI 
e v e n t s  ( 4  f o r  t he  a i r c r a f t - p a t h  and 3 f o r  t h e  actuator-path subsystem) and 
a n  e i g h t h  event t h a t  accounts f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of t h e  formation of a n  
empty confusion or ambiguity set when event 3 occurs  (no te  events 1 through 
4 correspond to t h e  events  discussed i n  subsec t ion  4.2). The FDI t r a n s i t i o n  
e v e n t s  are: 
1. AQI = A i r c r a f  t-path f a i l u r e  w a s  success fu l ly  i s o l a t e d ,  





































ACTUATOR FALSE TRIGGER (RESET) 
AIRCRAFT TRIGGER 
AIRCRAFT VERIFY & ISOLATE 
AIRCRAFT FALSE TRIGGER (RESET) 
AIRCRAFT UNABLE TO DECIDE (RESET) 
EMPTY AMBIGUITY/CONFUSION SET 
PARAMETER SETS USED IN FCS OPERATION 
ia PROCEDURE FOR UPDATING B fi, ti REDESIGNIRETRIM 
R-4943-A 
Figure 4-1. RFCS S ta te  Transit ion Diagram 
45 
2.  AQFT = Aircraf t -pa th  
3. AQD = Aircraf t -pa th  
dec ide  e i t h e r  
4. AQT = Aircraf t -pa th  
5. ACV = Actuator-path 
6. ACFT = Actuator-path 
7. ACT = Actuator-path 
The empty confusion set event 
of t h e  reconf iguration-method 
f a l s e  t r i g g e r  occurred ( a l l  v e r i f i e s  f a i l ) ,  
v e r i f y  and i s o l a t i o n  tests are unable t o  
1 o r  2 ,  
- 
t r i g g e r ,  but 1 - 4 y e t  t o  occur, I 
f a i l u r e  success fu l ly  v e r i f i e d ,  
false t r i g g e r  occurred, 
I t r i g g e r ,  5 o r  6 y e t  t o  occur. 
(C=@) occurs during c a l c u l a t i o n s  involved i n  two 
, ._ 
states (A3 and A q ) .  
Trans i t i ons  are always made wi th in  a single computational cyc le  u n t i l  a l l  
FDI e v e n t s  t ha t  occurred in t h a t  cyc le  are taken i n t o  account. T r a n s i t i o n s  
from one FCS state to  another implies t h a t  t he  gains and t r i m  va lues  last 
c r e a t e d  i n  the "target" state are t o  be used. T r a n s i t i o n s  without l a b e l s  
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  occurs i f  no o the r  FDI t r a n s i t i o n  events  are 
observed. When no unlabeled t r a n s i t i o n s  are given, t h e  state remains unchanged 
f o r  t h e  next cycle. 
The RFCS descr ibed  by Fig. 4-1 is capable of handling any combination 
of single a i r c r a f  t-path and mul t ip le  actuator-path f a i l u r e s  occurring sequen- 
t i a l l y  o r  simultaneously. A small degree of "self-healing" is  present  i n  t h e  
r e t u r n  t o  previous FCS parameter sets when ACD i s  followed by C=4 i n  t h e  same 
c y c l e  or by AQFT i n  a subsequent cycle. 
The reconfiguration-method states provide d i f f e r e n t  means f o r  updat ing  
t h e  ARM parameters and subsequently c a l l i n g  the  compensator redesign and 
au to- t r im algorithm. Each of these  states is now def ined  (note,  t he  RFCS 
s o f t w a r e  implementation of [ l o ]  does not incorpora te  t h e  exact log ic  of Fig. 



































Reconf i g u r a t i o n  Method A 1  
Method A 1  i s  used each t i m e  ACV occurs.  The mat r ix  Bf is computed us ing  
Eq. 4-2 w i t h  E{Ej) updated t o  zero  i f  a c tua to r  "j" w a s  v e r i f i e d .  E j  r e t a i n s  
i t s  previous  va lue  otherwise.  The values of a j  a r e  not updated, wp is  updated 
u s i n g  Eq. 4-4. F i n a l l y ,  both the  t r i m  and compensator redes ign  a lgor i thms are 
execu ted  i f  B f ,  wp, o r  any a j  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  than t h e i r  "previous" 
v a l u e s  (no te ,  "previous" here  is  used to  i n d i c a t e  t h e  va lues  computed a t  t h e  
last  t i m e  t h e  a lgor i thms were executed). 
Reconf igu ra t ion  Method A7 
This  is used any t i m e  AQI occurs. The matrix Bf is computed us ing  Eq. 
4-2 w i t h  EIEj) updated u s i n g  Eq. 4-12 wi th  p j  = 1 for j = t h e  i d e n t i f i e d  con- 
t r o l  o n l y  i f  i t  does not a l s o  have a v e r i f i e d  ac tua tor -pa th  f a i l u r e .  It is 
l e f t  a t  ze ro  (set previous ly  by AI) otherwise. 
aj w i t h  pj = 1 f o r  j = t h e  i d e n t i f i e d  con t ro l .  
up is unchanged. 
are s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  than t h e i r  "previous" va lues .  The t r i m  a lgor i thm 
Equation 4-3 is  used t o  update 
Otherwise i t  is l e f t  a t  zero. 
The compensator redesign algorithm is executed i f  Bf o r  a j  
i s  not executed. 
Reconf igu ra t ion  Methods A3  and A4 
The computations f o r  these  two states a r e  t h e  same. They are d i s t i n c t  
states because t h e i r  t r a n s i t i o n s  under AQFT are d i f f e r e n t .  This  method is  
used when AQD occurs.  
updated u s i n g  Eq. 4-8 wi th  p j  = 11Cli-1 f o r  j E C only i f  c o n t r o l  j does not 
a l s o  have a v e r i f i e d  actuator-path f a i l u r e .  
o u s l y  by A i )  otherwise.  
The matrix Bf is computed us ing  Eq. 4-2 wi th  E{Ej )  
It is l e f t  a t  zero  (set previ-  
Equation 4-9 is used t o  update  a j  wi th  p j  = IICII-l f o r  
j E C only  i f  c o n t r o l  j does not a l so  have a v e r i f i e d  actuator-path f a i l u r e .  
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Otherwise i t  is l e f t  a t  zero. 
a lgo r i thm is executed i f  Bf o r  any aj are s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  than  t h e i r  
p rev ious  values. The t r i m  a lgori thm i s  not executed. 
wp is  unchanged. The compensator redes ign  - 
Example 
An example of t h e  RFCS s t a t e  t r a n s i t i o n s  under mul t ip l e  f a i l u r e s  is now 
g iven .  Physical  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  some of the  t r a n s i t i o n  events  are also 
given .  _. 
1. A severe maneuver is  executed causing a n  AQD t r a n s i t i o n  t o  A3 
(due t o  l a r g e  model e r r o r  e x c i t a t i o n ) .  A C#g t r a n s i t i o n  t o  
F'  ' then  occurs .  
2 .  A small maneuver is executed causing a n  AQFT t r a n s i t i o n  back 
t o  Fo (small model errors are exc i ted) .  
3 .  An a i r c ra f t -pa th  f a i l u r e  on a marginally loaded su r face  occurs  
causing a n  AQD t r a n s i t i o n  t o  A3 followed by a (C#g) t r a n s i t i o n  
t o  F". I n  t h e  same cycle ,  an ACV event  occurs  causing a t ran-  
s i t i o n  from F" t o  A1 and then  t o  F' . 
4.  A maneuver occurs  t h a t  e x c i t e s  the  con t ro l  having an  a i r c r a f t -  
p a t h  f a i l u r e  causing a n  AQI t r a n s i t i o n  from F '  t o  A2 and then  
back t o  F' w i t h  a new set of FCS parameters. 
5. Some time later, another actuator-path f a i l u r e  occurs  causing 








































APPLICATION TO A MIDIFXED B-737 AIRCRAFT 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  t he  d e t a i l s  of t h e  in t eg ra t ed  RFCS demonstration system 
are provided and r e s u l t s  of extensive s imulat ions r e s u l t i n g  from embedding 
ALPHATECH'S RFCS software i n  NASA's nonlinear  6-DOF s imula t ion  of a modified 
B-737 are descr ibed.  Due t o  problems uncovered during sof tware i n t e g r a t i o n ,  
s e v e r a l  des ign  d e f i c i e n c i e s  t h a t  were i d e n t i f i e d ,  remained unsolved. However, 
t h e s e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  (mostly i n  t h e  FCS) do not a f f e c t  t h e  more meaningful con- 
c l u s i o n s  drawn from t h e  s imulat ion results. P l o t s  of a i r c r a f t  responses f o r  
v a r i o u s  s imula t ions  are given i n  Appendix A. 
5.1 DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM DETAILS 
5. I. 1 Operating P o i n t  
The choice of opera t ing  point  fo r  s imulat ions w a s  governed -y t he  f l i g h t  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  which the  FDI system w a s  designed [ 5 ] .  
def ined  by: 
The t r i m  condi t ion  is 
Velocity = 160 knots  
A l t i t ude  = 3500 f t  
Gear Up 
Flaps  = 15 degrees  
F l i g h t  path angle  = 0 degrees  
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The s ta te  and con t ro l  vectors are def ined by 
- 
v e l o c i t y ,  € t /sec 
v e r t i c a l  ve loc i ty ,  f t /sec 
p i t c h  rate, r ad l sec  
p i t ch  angle,  rad 
s i d e  v e l o c i t y  , f t /sec 
r o l l  rate,  rad/sec 
yaw rate, r ad l sec  
r o l l  angle, rad 
- 
u =  
l e f t  engine t h r u s t ,  lbs 
r i g h t  engine t h r u s t ,  l b s  
l e f t  s t a b i l a t o r ,  deg 
r i g h t  s t a b i l a t o r ,  deg 
rudder, deg 
l e f t  e l eva to r ,  deg 
r i g h t  e l eva to r ,  deg 
l e f t  a i l e r o n ,  deg 
r i g h t  a i l e r o n ,  deg 
l e f t  s p o i l e r ,  deg 
r i g h t  s p o i l e r ,  deg 
- 
The t r i m  values of x and u a t  t h i s  f l i g h t  condition are 





























0 .o - 
u0 = (3644, 3644, -3-1, -3.1, 0 ,  3.1, 3-19 0 ,  0 ,  0 ,  0) (5-4) 
T h e  l i n e a r  model f o r  per turba t ions  to t h i s  t r i m  c o n d i t i o n  when no f a i l u r e  
e x i s t s  is  
xp = A 0  xp + Bo up 
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(5 -6 )  
(5-7) 
The open loop eigenvalues  fo r  t he  a i r c r a f t  a t  t h i s  flight condi t ion  are 
Lateral Eigenvalues Longitudinal Eigenvalues 
Dutch R o l l  -0.125 5 1.23j Short  Per iod -.690 f: 1.36j 
Roll Subsidence -.0051 Phugoid -.00486 k 1.33j 
(5-8) 
S p i r a l  -2.02 
5.1.2 F l i g h t  Control  System 
The basel ine FCSs used f o r  t h i s  demo are f u l l  s ta te  feedback LQ des igns  
with i n t eg ra to r  compensation f o r  p i t c h  and bank angles  and f o r  forward and 
s i d e  v e l o c i t y  ( s e e  [l] for d e t a i l s ) .  Figure 5-1 shows the  FCS implementation 
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  i n s e r t i o n  of the t r i m  values .  Only primary cont ro l  su r f aces  
and t h e  t h r o t t l e  were used f o r  dynamic c o n t r o l  (no s p o i l e r s ) .  With compensa- 
t i o n  t h e  l i nea r  model becomes 
zp Azp + Bup 
where 
XI = c xp 
B =[:I 
0 0  
C = [ O  0 0  O 


























































G I  = EG9 G 1 0  G 1 1  G 1 2 1  
where G i  is t he  i t h  column of t he  compensator gain,  
The equat ions  of t he  compensator are: 
XI = -r + Cxp - Cxo 
u = uo - Grxr - GyCxp + GyC+ i- G y r  - GIXI 




0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
C r =  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0  I:",", : :  :1 (5-17) 
Two compensator ga ins  (G) were used i n  t h e  s imula t ion  r e s u l t s  descr ibed i n  
subsec t ion  5.2. The f i r s t  ga in  matr ix  is the  one used i n  [l]. This g a i n  made 
u s e  of f u l l  independent i nd iv idua l  c o n t r o l  elements ( r e f e r r e d  t o  later as 
t h e  f u l l  compensator). Unfortunately,  i t  was designed fo r  a d i f f e r e n t  f l i g h t  
c o n d i t i o n  than t h e  one being employed i n  this study. The ga in  matr ix  is  
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The r e s u l t i n g  closed loop eigenvalues a r e  
La te ra l  Longi t ud i  na 1 
-.60 ? . 5 9 j  -.071 5 -065j 
-1.1 -.54 (5-19) 
-2.1 2 1.7j -.84 f .87j  
-2 -6  -3.9 
An a l t e r n a t i v e  ga in  w a s  formulated using the  con t ro l  and s t a t e  weights used 
t o  produce the  G of Eq. 5-19 with A, and Bo of Eqs. 5-6 and 5-7. This  compen- 
sator d i d  not have s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  eigenvalues than those of Eq. 5-19. 
T i m e  d i d  not permit f u r t h e r  i nves t iga t ion  of a l t e r n a t i v e  f u l l  compensators. 
The second g a i n  matr ix  u t i l i z e d  only standard B-737 control action. This 
e l i m i n a t e s  a l l  use  of d i f f e r e n t i a l  s t a b i l i z e r ,  e l e v a t o r ,  and t h r o t t l e  and col-  
l e c t i v e  a i l e r o n .  Time did not p e r m i t  a de t a i l ed  des ign  of t h i s  compensator. 
The re fo re ,  we took t h e  con t ro l  and s t a t e  weights used i n  the  design of the  
g a i n s  i n  Eq. 5-18, generated a f u l l L Q  compensator from these  weights,  and set 
v a r i o u s  terms t o  zero.  The terms s e t  t o  zero were 1) t h e  lateral state feed- 
back t o  t h e  s t a b i l i z e r s ,  e leva tors ,  and t h r o t t l e s ,  2 )  t h e  long i tud ina l  state 
feedback t o  t h e  a i l e r o n s ,  a l l  i n t eg ra to r  s t a t e  feedback except the  i n t e g r a l  





























5 5  
The r e s u l t i n g  closed loop eigenvalues are 
Lateral Longitudinal 
-1.8 ? 2.0 j  -2.4 ? 1.4j 
-1.7 ? 0.35 j  -0.60 
-0.18 
( 5-2 1) 
-0.048 
.. 
The FCS l i m i t s  t h e  con t ro l  values  a t  t h e i r  maximum and minimum va lues  
and implements a nonminimal vers ion of t he  FCS i n  o rde r  t o  prevent i n t e g r a t o r  
windup when the  c o n t r o l s  reach these  limits [LO].  Unless s p e c i f i e d  o therwise  
i n  subsec t ion  5.2, t h e  c o n t r o l  limits are 
A w n  = (-2400, -2400, -10.8, -10.8, -10, -15 ,  -15, -20 ,  -20, 0, 0 )  (5-22) 
AumX = (9800, 9800, 6 .2 ,  6.2,  10, 15, 15, 20, 2 0 ,  8 ,  8 )  (5-23) 
5.1.3 Compensator Redesign Algorithm 
The inpu t s  to  t h e  compensator redesign algorithm are the  c o n t r o l  and 
s ta te  weighting matrices f o r  a b a s i s  c o n t r o l l e r ,  t he  l i n e a r  dynamics of t h e  
f a i l e d  a i r c r a f t  a t  some des i red  f l i g h t  condi t ion and some measure of uncer- 
t a i n t y  about the l i n e a r  model. We w i l l  assume t h a t  t h e  f l i g h t  cond i t ion  
de f ined  by Eqs. 5-3 t o  5-7 i s  the  des i r ed  post f a i l u r e  condi t ion.  S ince  no 
f a i l u r e  mode causes aerodynamic changes, the f a i l e d  A ma t r ix  AF = A,. The 
f a i l e d  B matrix,  Bf and the  uncer ta in ty  measure, Bijka,  are der ived i n  
S e c t i o n  3. For r e fe rence ,  the  s ta te  and con t ro l  weights used f o r  r edes ign  
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5 -1.4 Linear  T r i m  Algorithm 
The t r i m  a lgo r i thm u t i l i z e s  the same l i n e a r  model as the  compensator 
r edes ign  algori thm, plus;  1) a l i n e a r  model r e l a t i n g  t h e  important v a r i a b l e s  
t o  t h e  states, 2) upper  and lower bounds on allowable s t a t e  and c o n t r o l  per- 
t u r b a t i o n s ,  and 3) a weighting matrix t o  improve convergence of t he  q u a d r a t i c  
programming algorithm. 
The important v a r i a b l e s  a re ,  as i n  previous r epor t s ,  the  f l i g h t  pa th  
angle and angular  rates. The angular rates are states (making the  corre-  
sponding p a r t s  of t h e  l i n e a r  model for i t e m  1 t r i v i a l )  and the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between s ta te  pe r tu rba t ions  and per turbat ions t o  f l i g h t  path angle a t  this 
flight condi t ion  i s  
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Ay = 0.00030 A U  - 0.00353 AW + A 0  (5-26) 
The bounds on the  s ta te  and c o n t r o l  devia t ions  were der ived  i n  the  same manner 
a s  111 and, unless s p e c i f i e d  otherwise i n  subsect ion 4 .2 ,  are given by, 
a) A w n  = (-2400, -2400, -10.8, -10.8, -10, -15 ,  - 1 5 ,  -20 ,  -20 ,  0 ,  0 )  
b) Au, = (9800, 9800, 6.2 ,  6.2,  1 0 ,  15, 15, 20,  2 0 ,  8 ,  8 )  
(5 -27)  
a)  A w n  = (-30, -2.4, -3 ,  - .26 ,  -30 ,  -3 ,  - 3 ,  -.09) 
b)  AX-^ = (30, 20, 3 ,  -088, 30, 3 ,  3 ,  009) 
(5-28) 
- 
C o n s t r a i n t s  on angular rates are meaningless s ince  they are regula ted  as 
imp0 r t a n t  va r i ab le s  . 
5.1.5 Fa i lu re  De tec t ion  and I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
A complete d e s c r i p t i o n  of the FDI software i s  g iven  i n  [ l o ] .  I ts  design 
and performance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  are d e t a i l e d  in [ 5 ] .  For t h i s  p r o j e c t ,  a n  
i n t e r f a c e  module that t r a n s l a t e s  FDI test  results i n t o  appropr i a t e  f l a g s  f o r  
u s e  i n  the  RFCS l o g i c  w a s  designed. The i n t e r f a c e  module a l s o  expands the  
i s o l a t i o n  matrix t o  accommodate both ho r i zon ta l  t a i l  su r f aces  (same s i d e  ele- 
v a t o r  and s t a b i l i z e r  su r f aces  are t r e a t e d  as a s i n g l e  c o n t r o l  element i n  the  
FDI system s ince  they are ind i s t ingu i shab le ) .  For re ference  purposes, the  
FDI a i r c r a f t - p a t h  rou t ine  r e f e r s  t o  the  con t ro l  elements in t he  fol lowing 
o r d e r ;  
1. Lef t  T h r o t t l e  
2. Right T h r o t t l e  





















4. Right  Hor izonta l  T a i l  
5 .  Rudder 
6 .  L e f t  Ai leron 
7.  Right  Ai le ron  
5.2 DISCUSSION OF TEST CASE RESULTS 
T h i s  subsec t ion  provides a discuss ion  of the  s imula t ion  r e su l t s .  P l o t s  
of t h e  temporal responses  of important va r i ab le s  f o r  several important test _- 
cases are given  i n  Appendix A. This d i scuss ion  inc ludes  notes  on t h e  per- 
f ormance of t h e  a i r c r a f t  during maneuvers, the  o p e r a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
(s ta tes)  of t h e  RFCS, comparisons between performance wi th  and without  t h e  
- 
RFCS, t h e  e f f e c t s  due t o  FDI dec is ion  e r r o r s  and de lays ,  and t h e  f a u l t  toler- 
a n t  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of t h e  two nominal c o n t r o l  l a w s  employed i n  the  b a s e l i n e  FCS. 
The o r i g i n a l  test p lan  i s  given i n  Table 5-1. It w a s  formed t o  examine 
t h e  fo l lowing  issues: 
1. Comparison of earlier [ l ]  (ac tua tor  f a i l u r e )  r e s u l t s  which 
assumed p e r f e c t  FDI with a c t u a l  FDI r e s u l t s ,  
2. Examination of performance f o r  co r rec t ly  de t ec t ed  and i s o l a t e d  
a i r c r a f t  p a t h  f a i l u r e s ,  
3 .  Examination of degraded performance due t o  imperfect  i s o l a t i o n  
of aYrcraf t-path f a i l u r e s ,  
4. E f f e c t s  on performance of a i r c ra f t -pa th  f a l s e  t r i g g e r s .  
Most s imula t ions  were run with sensor  noise  and no turbulence.  The 
e f f e c t s  of tu rbulence  were examined i n  a f e w  examples near t h e  end of the 
p r o j e c t .  In add i t ion ,  base l ine  runs (no  f a i l u r e )  of two climbing t u r n  maneu- 
vers w e r e  made. I n  to ta l ,  NASA performed 40 s imula t ions  and made s u b s t a n t i a l  
m o d i f i c a t i o n s  to t h e  o r i g i n a l  s imulat ion and RFCS sof tware  i n  order  t o  enable  
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TABLE 5-1. ORIGINAL TEST PLAN 
Test Se t  1 (Ef fec t s  of R e a l  Actuator FDI) 
1.1.1 Maneuver: 
Failure:  
Envi ronme n t  : 
1.1.2 Maneuver: 
Fa i lu re  : 
Environment : 
1.1.3 Maneuver: 
Fa i lu re  : 
Environment : 
1.2.1 Maneuver: 
Fa i lure  : 
Environment : 
1.2.2 Maneuver: 
_ .  
Fai lure  : 
Environment : 
1.2.3 Maneuver: 
Fai lure:  
Environment : 
Climbing Turn a t  10 Seconds 
Stuck Rudder at 5 seconds 
No FDI o r  Recon 
Climbing Turn a t  10 Seconds 
Stuck Rudder a t  5 seconds 
Pe r fec t  FDI 
Climbing Turn a t  10 Seconds 
Stuck Rudder a t  5 seconds 
R e a l  RDI 
None 
S t a b i l a t o r  runaway of CR-178064 a t  5 Seconds 
No FDI  or  Recon, Travel  l i m i t s  of CR-178064 
None 
S t a b i l a t o r  runaway of CR-178064 a t  5 Seconds 
Pe r fec t  FDI,  Travel  limits of CR-178064 
None 
S t a b i l a t o r  runaway of CR-178064 a t  5 Seconds 






















TABLE 5-1. ORIGINAL TEST PLAN (Continued) 
T e s t  Se t  2 (Correc t ly  I so l a t ed  Aircraf t -Path F a i l u r e s )  
2.1.1 Maneuver: 
Fa i lu re :  
Environment : 
2.1 -2 Maneuver: 
Fa i lu re :  
Environment: 
2.2.1 Maneuver: 
F a i l u r e  : 
Environment : 
2.2.2 Maneiiver: 
F a i l u r e  : 
Environment : 
Climbing Turn a t  10 Seconds 
100% missing l e f t  a i l e r o n  a t  5 seconds 
N o  FDI  o r  Recon 
Climbing Turn a t  10 Seconds 
100% missing l e f t  a i l e r o n  at 5 seconds _.- 
Real FDI 
Climbing Turn a t  10 Seconds 
100% missing rudder at 5 seconds 
No FDI o r  Recon 
Climbing Tarn  a t  10 Seconds 
100% missing rudder at 5 seconds 
Real FDI 
T e s t  Se t  3 (Imperfect ly  I s o l a t e d  Aircraf t -Path Fa i lu re s )  
Small Ambiguity Group (LE/LS) 
3.1.1 Maneuver: Climbing Turn a t  10 Seconds 
F a i l u r e  : 
Environment : No FDI 
100% missing l e f t  s t a b i l a t o r  at 5 seconds 
3.1.2 Maneuver: Climbing Turn a t  10 Seconds 
F a i l u r e  : 
E nvi ronme n t  : Real FDI 
100% missing l e f t  s t a b i l a t o r  a t  5 seconds 
(Continued) 
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TABLE 5-1. ORIGINAL TEST PLAN (Continued) - 
Large Ambiguity Group (LE, LS, RE, RS) 
3.2.1 Maneuver: Climbing Turn a t  10 Seconds 
F a i l u r e  : 100% missing l e f t  e l e v a t o r  a t  5 seconds 
E nvi r onme n t : No FDI 
3.2.2 Maneuver: Climbing Turn a t  10 Seconds 
F a i l u r e  : 100% missing l e f t  elevator at  5 seconds 
Environment : Real FDI 
- 
Test  Se t  4 (Aircraf t -Path Fa lse  Tr iggers )  
4.1.1 Maneuver: 
F a i l u r e  : 
Envi ronme n t  : 
4 .L .2 Maneuver: 
F a i l u r e  : 
Environment: 
. .  
4.2 .1 Maneuver: 
F a i l u r e  : 
Environment : 
4.2 .2 Maneuver: 
F a i l u r e  : 
Environment : 
P i t c h  Doublet a t  10 Seconds 
None 
No FDI 
P i t ch  Doublet at 10 Seconds 
No ne 
Real FDI 
R o l l  Doublet a t  10 Seconds 
None 
No FDI 























ba tch  ope ra t ion  on t h e  CDC Cyber machine and t o  c o r r e c t  d a t a  and l o g i c a l  f laws 
i n  t h e  RFCS design. 
- 
It should be mentioned aga in  t h a t  c e r t a i n  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  the  compensator 
d e s i g n s  were known to  e x i s t  (see subsect ion 3.1.2). The r e s u l t s  presented  
h e r e  should t h e r e f o r e  be used f o r  comparison purposes only. Actual  per for -  
mance of t h e  a i r c r a f t  under both f a i l e d  and unfa i led  cond i t ions  would be d i f -  
f e r e n t  had these  d e f i c i e n c i e s  been remedied. Nevertheless ,  t h e  comparisons 
of performance =de i n  t h i s  repor t  a r e  believed to  be r ep resen ta t ive  of t h e  
_-  
o v e r a l l  performance of t he  in tegra ted  r e s t r u c t u r a b l e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system. 
The rest of t h i s  s e c t i o n  is organized by groups of s imula t ion  runs.- For 
each  group, a b r i e f  d i scuss ion  of t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of each run and a com- 
p a r i s o n  of r e s u l t s  is given. 
5 -2 .1 Basel ine Maneuvers (ROO1 and R 0 3 6 )  
Appendix A d e f i n e s  the  command p r o f i l e s  and shows t h e  command response  
f o r  t h e s e  two runs. ROOl uses  the f u l l  FCS (i.e., nonstandard c o n t r o l  a c t i o n )  
and t h e  original climbing t u r n  maneuver (CTL) whle R 0 3 6  uses  the l i m i t e d  FCS 
(on ly  s tandard  c o n t r o l  a c t i o n  and no i n t e g r a t o r s  on p i t ch ,  bank o r  s i d e s l i p )  




3 .  
The a i r c r a f t  response i n  ROOl i s  similar t o  t h a t  of [ l ]  d e s p i t e  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t he  compensator was designed f o r  a d i f f e r e n t  oper- 
a t i n g  point .  
The e f f e c t s  of the  nonminimal r e a l i z a t i o n  (used t o  handle windup 
i n  t h e  i n t e g r a t o r s )  i s  seen i n  the  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r o l s  do not  
r e t u r n  t o  t h e i r  t r i m  values a f t e r  t he  maneuver. 
The e f f e c t s  of the lack of sensor  compensation is a l s o  seen  i n  
t h e  high frequency ac tua tor  a c t i v i t y ,  a l though t h i s  does not 
a f f e c t  t h e  a i rcraf t  response. 
6 3  
4 .  
5. 
6 .  
7. 
8 .  
The trim values  used in t he  FCS a r e  not c o r r e c t .  This is evi-  
denced i n  t h e  ca l ib ra t ed  a i r speed  response before  the  manedver - 
occurs. 
The a l t i t u d e  response f o r  R036 i s  not very good (i is not zero  
i n  steady state). 
Bank and r o l l  responses f o r  R036 and ROO1 are s i m i l a r ,  al though 
R036 h a s  a l a r g e r  s i d e s l i p  response. 
The a i l e ron  response f o r  R036 is  smaller than  f o r  ROOL. 
The speed response f o r  R036 i s  slower than i n  ROO1, although 
a d i r e c t  comparison is not poss ib le  s ince  t h e  maneuvers are 
d i f  fe ren t .  
DUAL STABILIZER RUNAWAY (R006, R025, R026) - 
I n  each of t hese  s imulat ions,  both l e f t  and r i g h t  s t a b i l i z e r s  ramp t o  
t h e i r  trailing-edge-up l i m i t  at 5 seconds. No maneuver is executed. The 
f u l l  FCS is used i n  each run. Run ROO6 has no reconf igura t ion ,  R025 executes  
t h e  RFCS, and R026 executes  the  RFCS with a "perfect"  FDI module ( f a i l u r e  i s  
d e t e c t e d  a t  its onse t  time). 
Notes 
1. Run ROO6 e x h i b i t s  severe depar ture  from t h e  nominal f l i g h t  con- 
d i t i o n .  Large phugoid o s c i l l a t i o n s  are present  f o r  more than  a 
minute a f t e r  t h e  f a i l u r e  t i m e .  The airspeed drops t o  a minimum 
of  137 fps (from a t r i m  value of 289 fps ) ,  p i t c h  angle reaches a 
maximum value  of 40 degrees at about 15 seconds and 50 seconds,  
and the angle  of a t t a c k  reaches a maximum of 23.99 degrees  (pos- 
s i b l y  a s imula t ion  l i m i t )  s e v e r a l  t i m e s .  The e l eva to r  s a t u r a t e s  
f a i r l y  quick ly  i n  response t o  the  pos i t i ve  p i t ch ing  moment caused 
by t h e  f a i l u r e ,  but t h i s  is i n s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  r e c o v e r y f s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
of t h e  a i r c r a f t  . 
2 .  Run R025 e x h i b i t s  super ior  recovery performance. This is bel ieved 
t o  be l a r g e l y  due t o  the  decrease i n  t r i m  a i r speed  assigned by 
the RFCS. 
a r r e s t e d  very quickly (6c/6u Au is  used t o  cance l  t he  & d i s t u r -  
bance due t o  the  f a i l u r e ) .  
response in t h i s  run t h a t  could be considered worse than R006. 
I n  R025, a i rspeed  drops only t o  a minimum of 184 f p s ,  p i t c h  angle  
This  causes the  departure  of t he  angle of a t t a c k  to be 
The a l t i t u d e  response is the  only 
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only reaches a maximum of 20  degrees  and is near ly  s t a b i l i z e d  
by 35 seconds (although some small phugoid o s c i l l a t i o n  or slow - 
depa r tu re  may e x i s t )  and the angle  of a t t a c k  reaches a maximum of 
12.6 degrees  a t  24 seconds and is  s t a b i l i z e d  a t  about 10 degrees  
by 36 seconds. The e leva tor  and t h r o t t l e  responses show the  
major c o n t r o l  d i f f e rences  between t h i s  run and R006. T h r o t t l e  
is immediately reduced when t h e  f a i l u r e  is de tec t ed  (as i n  [l] 
i n  order  to  achieve t h e  lower t r i m  a i rspeed.  
3. The f a i l u r e  is  de tec ted  at 5.3 seconds (0.3 seconds af ter  t h e  
runaway is  i n i t i a t e d ) .  New ga ins  are computed at t h i s  t i m e  and 
a t  32 seconds,  when t h e  a i rc raf t -pa th  FDI system t r i g g e r s  ano the r  
redesign. This  redesign is i n  response t o  a n  undetermined 
a i r c r a f t - p a t h  f a i l u r e  (LE, RE, or LA) t h a t  is declared because 
of t he  s i g n i f i c a n t  devia t ions  of the a i r c r a f t  from the  ope ra t ing  
po in t  f o r  which the  FDI s y s t e m  w a s  designed. 
po in t  t o  a sof tware e r r o r  i n  t h e  implementation of the  confus ion  
set (see Sec t ion  4), however, the  impact on a i r c r a f t  performance 
is  n e g l i g i b l e  (see note  4). The t r i m  a lgori thm is  executed - 
almost every t i m e  s t e p  between 5.3 seconds and 8.5 seconds and 
never  used again.  This  i s  due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s t a b i l i z e r  
runaway f a i l u r e  is implemented as a ramp at t h e  ac tua to r  rate 
l i m i t  u n t i l  t h e  ac tua to r  reaches i t  pos i t i on  l i m i t .  The d i s t u r -  
bances change as t h e  ramp progresses  and t h e  t r i m  a lgori thm i s  
executed i n  response to  these changes. The t r i m  is not executed 
once t h e  d i s tu rbances  s top  changing ( s t a b i l i z e r s  a t  t h e i r  l i m i t s ) .  
The FDI r e s u l t s  
4. Run R026 l o o k s  near ly  i d e n t i c a l  t o  R025 i n  a l l  r e spec t s  indi-  
cating t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  small FDI delay  is negl ig ib le .  
5.2.2 L e f t  S t a b i l i z e r  Runaway (R034 and R035) 
I n  both of t h e s e  runs,  the l imited FCS is used. The f a i l u r e  occurs  a t  
t h e  maneuver (CTl) t i m e  and is  implemented by causing t h e  l e f t  s t a b i l i z e r  t o  
ramp t o  i t s  l i m i t .  Run R034 does not u t i l i z e  the  RFCS and R035 uses  t h e  com- 
- _  
p l e t e  RFCS ( real  FDI) . 
Notes 
1. I n  R035, t h e  FDI system de tec t s  and v e r i f i e s  t h e  ac tua to r  f a i l -  
u r e  at  10.35 seconds ( t h e  f a i l u r e  and maneuver occur a t  10.0 
seconds). The t r i m  algorithm is executed almost every t i m e  s t e p  
between 10.35 and 12.45 seconds and then aga in  a t  34, 41, 47 and 
49 seconds. The i n i t i a l  c a l l s  t o  TRIM are due t o  the  changing 





5 .  
no ise  i n  the  sensors  used t o  es t imate  the  d is turbance .  The t r i m  
algorithm employs 8 degrees  of l e f t  s p o i l e r  d e f l e c t i o n  t o  eoun- - 
teract the r o l l i n g  moment due t o  the f a i l u r e .  
The a l t i t u d e  response f o r  R035 i s  a c t u a l l y  b e t t e r  than the  
response with no f a i l u r e  (R036). This is due t o  the  f a c t  t h a t  
R036 u t i l i z e s  a c o n t r o l  l a w  t h a t  i s  d e f i c i e n t  i n  many ways as 
compared t o  t h e  "basis-compensator" (i.e., t he  compensator 
r e s u l t i n g  from computing new ga ins  with no f a i l u r e ) .  
Comparing R034 and R035, we see t h a t  t he  a l t i t u d e  and bank ang le  
responses are b e t t e r  with reconfigurat ion.  
is  lowered by 26 f p s  f o r  t h i s  case, which al lows the  maneuver 
u t i l i z e s  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e l e v a t o r ,  a i l e ron ,  and increased use of 
t h e  remaining s t a b i l i z e r  to  r e t u r n  the  bank angle  t o  zero a f t e r  
t h e  maneuver. 
nonzero bank angle. 
Run R034 has  a s u r p r i s i n g l y  adequate recovery p r o f i l e .  The 
ailerons have s u f f i c i e n t  a u t h o r i t y  t o  counterac t  t he  f a i l u r e  
induced r o l l i n g  moment, even without i n t e g r a t o r s  on bank angle 
i n  the control l a w  ( s e e  subsec t ion  4.1). 
The new t r i m  a i r speed  
t o  occur with, genera l ly ,  smaller con t ro l  de f l ec t ions .  R035 ._ 
Run R034 is only ab le  to  r e t u r n  t o  a s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
- 
This  case  would be an  i n t e r e s t i n g  one t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  with a 
p i lo t ed  s imula t ion  with a minimal s t a b i l i t y  augmentation system 
as the nominal FCS. This is not a typ ica l  of commercial t r a n s p o r t  
a i r c r a f t  and would serve  t o  demonstrate t he  t r u e  s e v e r i t y  of 
t h i s  f a i l u r e .  
5.2.3 Missing Ai le ron  Fa i lu re  (R032, R033, R013, and R014) 
Runs R032 and R 0 3 3  u t i l i z e d  t h e  l imi ted  FCS and no and f u l l  reconfigura-  
t i o n ,  respec t ive ly .  
r econf igu ra t ion ,  respec t ive ly .  A l l  runs were made with CTL. The f a i l u r e  is  
Runs R013 and R014 u t i l i z e d  the  f u l l  FCS with no and f u l l  . .  
a 100 percent  reduct ion  i n  t h e  e f f ec t iveness  of a s i n g l e  a i l e ron .  
Notes 
1- In R014 t h e  FDI system d e t e c t s  and i s o l a t e s  t he  a i r c r a f t  path 
f a i l u r e  a t  11.5 seconds, 1.5 seconds a f t e r  t he  maneuver occurs  
and .7 seconds after the  t r i g g e r  occurs. New ga ins  a r e  calcu- 
l a t e d  and no t r i m  is necessary.  
2. In  R014, both the  p i t ch  and the  bank responses are v i r t u a l l y  






























3. P i t c h  and bank responses for R013 are also ind i s t ingu i shab le  
from ROOL. This  v e r i f i e s  the conclusion i n  [l] t h a t  independent 
c o n t r o l  of i nd iv idua l  ( l e f t  and r i g h t )  c o n t r o l  elements a l lows  a 
proper ly  designed FCS to  posses s  much passive f a u l t  to le rance .  
4. Even wi th  t h e  l imi ted  FCS (R032) a s u b s t a n t i a l  degree of pass ive  
f a u l t  t o l e rance  i s  observed. The bank response is  expected t o  
be d i f f e r e n t  than R013 and R014 due t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  c o n t r o l  
l a w s .  It i s  s t i l l  very close t o  the no-fai lure  case. 
5 .  Improvements i n  R032 due t o  reconf igura t ion  ( seen  i n  R033) are 
due t o  the f a c t  t h a t  t h e  basis-compensator is b e t t e r  than t h e  
l i m i t e d  FCS. The improved response, however, comes with in- 
c r eased  u s e  of some of t h e  cont ro ls .  This  is due t o  t h e  h ighe r  
loop ga ins  present  i n  t h e  basis-compensator. 
5.2.4 Stuck Rudder (R030 and R031) - 
Runs RO30 and R031 both use the l imi t ed  FCS. The rudder w a s  f a i l e d  
b e f o r e  t h e  maneuver (CTL) occurred. Runs were made wi th  the  f u l l  FCS f o r  
t h i s  f a i l u r e  mode also; however, they are not d i scussed  he re  (see [l], r e s u l t s  
were e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same). For R031, t he  state l i m i t s  used i n  t h e  t r i m  algo- 
r i t h m  were modified t o  r equ i r e  zero s i d e s l i p  i n  s teady  state. This  w a s  done 
t o  highlight &he d i f f e rences  between t h e  two runs. 
Notes 
1. In R031, t h e  FDI system d e t e c t s  t he  a c t u a t o r  f a i l u r e  a t  5.75 
seco-ads. 
t h e  large rudder commands induced by sensor  no i se  ( t h e  FCS 
d e f i c i e n c y  he lps  de tec t ion  i n  t h i s  case). 
occurs  immediately and, because the  rudder f a i l e d  of f  c e n t e r  
(about  3 degrees) ,  a new t r i m  so lu t ion  w a s  obtained.  
t r i m  i nc ludes  s u b s t a n t i a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t h r o t t l e  as w e l l  as a 
few degrees  of s p o i l e r  def lec t ion .  
t h e  rudder measurement causes enough change i n  t h e  d i s tu rbance  
estimate t o  cause many retrimming opera t ions  throughout t h e  run. 
A f a l s e  t r i g g e r  i n  the  a i r c r a f  t-path is subsequently i d e n t l f  i e d  
as such a t  18 seconds. 
The d e t e c t i o n  occurs before  t h e  maneuver because of 
Compensator redes ign  
The new 
The n o l s e  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  
2. I n  both R030 and R031, the rudder f a i l u r e  excites a dutch r o l l  
mode. Th i s  mode is less damped without r econf igu ra t ion  because 
t h e  b a s e l i n e  FCS is less damped than the  basis-compensator. 
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3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
6 .  
The bank responses are hard t o  compare because of the  d i f f e r e n c e s  
between t h e  base l ine  FCS and t h e  basis-compensator. However, t h e  
s i d e s l i p  angle  r e t a i n s  an o f f s e t  from zero (-2 degrees)  a f t e r  
t h e  maneuver t h a t  is el iminated by the  t r i m  a lgor i thm i n  R031.  
The improvements t o  the  a l t i t u d e  response when using the  RFCS 
are a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  base l ine  FCS 
and the basis-compensator . 
There is less use  of d i f f e r e n t i a l  a i l e r o n  i n  R031  due t o  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  t h r o t t l e  and s p o i l e r  d e f l e c t i o n s  caused by t h e  t r i m  




Comparison of runs ROO2 and ROO9 (real and p e r f e c t  FDI f o r  s tuck-  
rudder f a i l u r e  using f u l l  FCS) shows no s i g n i f i c a n t  performance 
d i f f e rences  . 
- 5.2.5 Missing S t a b i l i z e r  Fa i lu re  (R017 and R018) 
Runs RO17 and R018 both employed t h e  f u l l  compensator and executed t h e  
CTL maneuver. The f a i l u r e  w a s  s imulated by s e t t i n g  t h e  l e f t  s t a b i l i z e r  e f fec-  
t i v e n e s s  to zero before  the  maneuver (at  t = 5 sec.). Run R017 d i d  no t  u t i -  
l i z e  t h e  RFCS and R 0 1 8  implemented t h e  f u l l  RFCS. 
Notes 
1. In R018, t h e  FDI system d e t e c t s  and i s o l a t e s  a " f i c t i t i o u s "  l e f t  
h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  f a i l u r e  a t  6 seconds. Recall t h a t  t h e  known 
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b i l i t y  of t h e  l e f t  s t a b i l i z e r  and l e f t  e l eva to r  
l e d  us to t h e  e l imina t ion  of tests t h a t  would have t r i e d  t o  dis- 
t i n g u i s h  t h e s e  two f a i l u r e s .  
a n  u'ndetermined f a i l u r e  (LS o r  LE) and new ga ins  are der ived.  
A f a l s e  t r i g g e r  of the l e f t  a i l e r o n  occurs at 8 seconds and i s  
subsequently i d e n t i f i e d  as such (unknown cause).  
f i g u r a t i o n  events  take place a f t e r  t h i s .  
The FDI system t h e r e f o r e  d e c l a r e s  
No o the r  recon- 
2.  Both R017 and R018 have a small drop i n  a l t i t u d e  before  t h e  
maneuver t h a t  is caused by t h e  f a i l u r e  and is not present  i n  t h e  
base l ine  (no-f a i l u r e )  case (ROO1) . 
3. Differences between c o n t r o l  responses f o r  R017 and R018 are 
s i g n i f i c a n t .  Run R018 (with reconf igura t ion)  u ses  less e l e v a t o r  
and r i g h t  s t a b i l i z e r  during t h e  maneuver. Noticable  but i n s ig -  
n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  bank response between these  runs is  
present .  The same i s  t r u e  f o r  t h e  a i r speed  and p i t c h  responses.  
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4. There i s  no s u b s t a n t i a l  performance d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  e i t h e r  run 
as compared t o  t h e  no f a i l u r e  case (ROO1). - 
OTHER RUNS 
Many o t h e r  s imula t ions  were run inc luding  a missing-elevator  f a i l u r e ,  a 
missing-rudder f a € l u r e ,  r o l l  and pi tch doublets with no f a i l u r e  ( t o  examine 
FDI f a l s e  alarm performance) and several runs with turbulence.  The r e s u l t s  of 
t h e s e  runs a l l  suppor t  t h e  conclusions drawn i n  subsec t ion  5.3 and S e c t i o n  6. 
5.3 SUMMARY 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we presented d e t a i l s  of an RFCS des ign  f o r  a modified 
- 
B-737 a i r c r a f t .  Th i s  RFCS included func t iona l  e l e a e n t s  t o  d e t e c t  and i s o l a t e  
a i  rcraf t-path and ac tua tor -pa th  c o n t r o l  element f a i l u r e s  , t o  redes ign  t h e  
feedback compensator a f t e r  a f a i l u r e  has  been de tec t ed ,  and t o  retrim t h e  
a i r c r a f t  when s i g n i f i c a n t  measurable d is turbances  are present.  
no t  i nc lude  any f u n c t i o n  t o  es t imate  remaining c o n t r o l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o r  t o  
The RFCS d i d  
estimate ( r a t h e r  t h a n  measure) s i g n i f i c a n t  dis turbances.  
Extens ive  tests using NASA's nonl inear  6-DOF s imula t ion  were made. These 
tests were aimed at  examining the impact of FDI d e l a y s  and incomplete ED1 
d e c i s i o n s  as w e l l  as examining t h e  recovery c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  compensator 
r e d e s i g n  and retrim algori thms.  
- .  
Although t h e  tests are extensive,  they do not r ep resen t  a d e t a i l e d  exper- 
i m e n t a l  paradigm. Therefore ,  any conclusions drawn from t h e s e  r e s u l t s  should 
be  s e p a r a t e l y  v e r i f i e d .  Also, s eve ra l  design d e f i c i e n c i e s  were p resen t  i n  
t h e  f i n a l  RFCS due t o  a l ack  of ava i l ab le  t i m e  to c o r r e c t  them. These d e f i -  
c i e n c i e s  included: 1) a nonminiaal FCS r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  w a s  implemented i n  
o r d e r  t o  handle windup of the  i n t e g r a t o r s ,  2) no f i l t e r t n g  of the senso r  
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measurements, 3) c o n t r o l  weights f o r  t h e  compensator redes ign  a lgor i thm or ig-  
i n a t e d  i n  [l], which used l i n e a r  models of the  a i r c r a f t  a t  a d i f f e r e n t  f l i g h t  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  tuning purposes, 4 )  t h e  l imi ted  FCS w a s  developed in a very 
ad hoc manner near t h e  end of the p r o j e c t ,  and 5) t h e  low bandwidth of t h e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  t h r o t t l e  loop used i n  [l] is  s t i l l  p resen t  i n  the  f u l l  base l ine  
compensator used in t h i s  study. 
- 
A genera l  summary of the  r e s u l t s  descr ibed i n  subsec t ion  5.2 is  now 
given .  
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4 .  
In general ,  the  RFCS provided t h e  most b e n e f i t  during c a t a s t r o p i c  
f a i l u r e s  such as a runaway f a i l u r e .  The r e t r i m  a lgori thm is - 
believed responsible  f o r  t h i s  s i n c e  i t  a l lows  recovery methods 
t h a t  cannot be obtained i n  any o the r  way. The use  of changes i n  
t r i m  v e l o c i t y  appeared p a r t i c u l a r l y  use fu l  f o r  t h e  runaway cases 
examined i n  t h i s  study. This w a s  a l s o  observed i n  [I] and repre-  
s e n t s  a f a i l u r e  recovery s o l u t i o n  t h a t  is c o n t r a r y  t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  
p i l o t  t r a i n i n g  f o r  these cases. 
KFCS performance was v i r t u a l l y  ind i s t ingu i shab le  i n  comparisons 
of r e a l  and pe r fec t  FDI cases. The FDI d e l a y s  of up t o  s e v e r a l  
seconds f o r  a i r c ra f t -pa th  f a i l u r e s  and up to 1 second f o r  actu- 
a t o r  path f a i l u r e s  are the re fo re  considered more than  adequate. 
Th i s  w a s  true f o r  missing, stuck-at and runaway f a i l u r e s .  
The base l ine  con t ro l  l a w  was  s u f f i c i e n t l y  robus t  t o  adequately 
compensate f o r  stuck-at and t o t a l l y  missing f a i l u r e s .  
t r u e  f o r  t h e  f u l l  Compensator ( u t i l i z i n g  nonstandard c o n t r o l  
ac t ion  f o r  t h e  E-737) - and f o r  t h e  l imi ted  compensator ( u t i l i z i n g  
only-s tandard  B-737 c o n t r o l  ac t ion) .  In many cases, t h e  e f f e c t s  
of the f a i l u r e  were barely observable and i n  no case was the  air- 
craft 's maneuvering performance s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f fec ted .  It is  
bel ieved t h a t  the good low-frequency gains  and the  con t ro l  of 
p i t c h  and bank angles i n  both of the  base l ine  compensators and 
the large s t a b i l i t y  margins of LQ designs are t h e  major f a c t o r s  
in f luenc ing  t h i s  r e s u l t .  
t o l e r a n t  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of o t h e r  types of compensators ( inc luding  
a p i lo ted  s imulat ion)  would be very i n s t r u c t i v e .  
This  w a s  
A f u r t h e r  examination of the  f a u l t  
The method used to handle unce r t a in ty  about t h e  f a i l u r e  i d e n t i t y  
(confusion set  operat ions)  could not be accu ra t e ly  evaluated 
because of some undetermined implementation e r r o r s .  However, 
t h e  s imula t ions  r e su l t i ng  i n  inco r rec t  confusion sets d id  not 
show any s i g n i f i c a n t  performance degradation. 
ges t s  t h a t  the  s t a b i l i t y  and performance robustness  of t he  





















basis-compensator is s u b s t a n t i a l  ( r e s u l t i n g  i n  even good robust-  
ness  f o r  an i n c o r r e c t l y  redesigned compensator). Other sufiport - 
f o r  t h i s  inc ludes  lack of any s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  due t o  a i r c r a f t -  
path f a l s e  alarms. 
5. The more severe  f a i l u r e s  such as s t a b i l i z e r  runaways can cause 
enough of a depa r tu re  from t h e  nominal f l i g h t  cond i t ion  to  
gene ra t e  a i r c r a f t - p a t h  f a l s e  ind ica t ions .  This  is due t o  t h e  
s i n g l e - f l i g h t  conditLon FDI des ign  and t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  modeling 
e r r o r s  t h a t  are encountered during f a i l u r e  recovery.  As men- 
t ioned  above, such f a l s e  ind ica t ions  never s i g n i f i c a n t l y  impacted 
a i r c r a f t  performance. 
6 . Some of t he  pos t - fa i lure  reconf igured responses  t o  maneuver 
commands showed improvements over t h e  no-f a i l u r e  response wi th  
t h e  l imi t ed  FCS. This  is  bel ieved t o  be due to  t h e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  
in t h e  des ign  of t he  l imited FCS r a t h e r  than  t h e  nonstandard 
c o n t r o l  c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  reconfigured FCS. - 
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SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
The purpose of t h i s  study w a s  t o  examine the  complementary c a p a b i l i t i e s  
of s e v e r a l  r e s t r u c t u r a b l e  f l i g h t  cont ro l  system (RFCS) concepts through t h e  
i n t e g r a t i o n  of t hese  technologies  i n t o  a complete system. Performance i s s u e s  
were addressed through a re-examination of RFCS func t iona l  requirements,  and 
though a q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  of 
d u r i n g  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  w i l l  l ead  t o  
performance. Sof mare developed 
- 
the design i s s u e s  that, i f  properly addressed 
the h ighes t  poss ib le  degree of f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
under previous phases of t h i s  c o n t r a c t  and 
under  NASl-18004 was  modified and in tegra ted  i n t o  a complete RFCS subrout ine  
f o r  NASA's B-737 simulat ion.  The in t eg ra t ion  of these  modules involved t h e  
development of methods f o r  dea l ing  with the  mismatch between the  ou tpu t s  of 
t h e  f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n  module and the inpu t  requirements of t h e  automatic  con- 
t r o l  system redes ign  module. The performance OE t h i s  demonstration system w a s  
examined through ex tens ive  simulation trials. - -  
A g e n e r a l  summary of t he  simulation r e s u l t s  was given i n  subsec t ion  5.3. 
The fol lowing sugges t ions  f o r  future  e f f o r t s  are der ived from these  r e s u l t s ,  
from a q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  p o t e n t i a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of the demonstrat ion 
system f o r  o t h e r  types  of a i r c r a f t ,  and from some of t he  r e s u l t s  i n  [l]. 
1. The two LQ des igns  f o r  the FCS both exhib i ted  a g r e a t  dea l  of 
pas s ive  f a u l t  to le rance .  This  r e s u l t  w a s  observed i n  [l] and 
w a s  t h e r e f o r e  expected for  t h e  FCS t h a t  u t i l i z e d  f u l l  indepen- 
d e n t  c o n t r o l  a c t i o n  (nonstandard f o r  t he  B-737). However, t h e  
degree  of f a u l t  to le rance  of t he  "standard" FCS (an  LQ des ign  
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u t i l i z i n g  only  standard B-737 c o n t r o l  a c t i o n )  w a s  su rp r i s ing .  
The use of p i t c h  and bank angles  as re ference  commands may-have . 
been p a r t i a l l y  responsible f o r  t h i s  r e s u l t .  A u s e f u l  t op ic  of 
fu tu re  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  would be the  passive f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  capa- 
b i l i t i e s  of conventional and e x i s t i n g  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  systems and 
o t h e r  F C S  des ign  methods. 
2. A fu r the r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of t h e  u t i l i t y  of t he  compensator rede- 
s i g n  methodology would be use fu l .  I n  t h i s  p r o j e c t  and i n  [l J , 
very  l i t t le  performance improvements due t o  redesigned ga ins  
were observed. This is due t o  the  s u b s t a n t i a l  f a u l t  t o l e rance  
of the b a s e l i n e  c o n t r o l l e r s  and the  s t a b i l i t y  of the  B-737 
a i r c r a f t .  It is expected t h a t  compensator redes ign  would be 






3. I n  t h i s  s tudy ,  we se lec ted  a des i red  pos t - f a i lu re  opera t ing  
po in t  a r b i t r a r i l y .  The opera t ing  point  s e l e c t i o n  problem is 
one tha t  needs t o  be developed. This problem involves  deciding 
on the use of nondynamic con t ro l s  ( f l a p s ,  gea r ,  weight r e d i s t r i -  
bution),  r e l axa t ion  of t he  "model v a l i d i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s "  i n  t h e  
t r i m  algorithm, se l ec t ion  of s tandard t r i m  i n p u t s  ( l i k e  f l i g h t  
p a t h  and v e l o c i t y ) ,  and p i l o t  i n t e rac t ion .  The use of nondynamic 
con t ro l s  i n  t h e  t r i m  a lgori thm may involve a n  ex tens ion  of t h e  
quadra t i c  opt imizat ion procedure t o  a mixed discrete-cont inuous 
procedure; branch-and-bound methods may be appropr i a t e  i n  t h i s  
regard. Successive r e l axa t ion  of model v a l i d i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  is  
a powerful means of i t e r a t i v e l y  determining t h e  b e s t  opera t ing  
poin t .  However, s t a b i l i t y  concerns need to  be addressed i n  any 
such procedure. 
4. P i l o t  i n t e r a c t i o n  with a RFCS needs t o  be addressed i n  o the r  
areas bes ides  operat ing po in t  s e l ec t ion .  The re ference  commands 
i n  the LQ FCS are generated by the  p i l o t  and, i f  t he  RFCS works 
w e l l ,  would make the  f a i l u r e  i n v i s i b l e  t o  t h e  p i l o t .  If  t h e  
p i l o t  were allowed t o  s e l e c t  reconf i g u r a t i o n  as an a u t o p i l o t  
option, reconf igu ra t ion  t r a n s i e n t s  could be s i g n i f i c a n t .  The  
p i l o t - r e a c t i o n s  to  such t r a n s i e n t s  could have a l a r g e  impact on 
f a i l u r e  recovery performance. 
5. The log ic  of t he  RFCS system developed f o r  t h i s  p ro jec t  i s  rela- 
t i v e l y  s t ra ight forward .  However, as FDI c a p a b i l i t i e s  expand t o  
include sensor  and o ther  equipment, more complex l o g i c  will be 
needed. It is  possible  t h a t  t he  u s e  of a rule-based system f o r  
managing the p o t e n t i a l  v a r i e t y  of ope ra t iona l  states would be 
e f f ec t ive .  
6. An extension t o  t h e  t r i m  a lgori thm t h a t  incorpora tes  known aero- 
dynamic n o n l i n e a r i t i e s  would be useful .  I n  s p e c i a l  cases (e.g., 
i n v e r t i b l e  con t ro l  n o n l i n e a r i t i e s  t h a t  appear i d e n t i c a l l y  i n  a l l  
axes) t h e  extension may be s t ra ight forward .  
7 4  
7.  While t h i s  s tudy d e a l t  w i t h  c o n t r o l  element f a i l u r e s ,  it is 
l i k e l y  t h a t  some f a i l u r e s  of i n t e r e s t  will inc lude  changes-to 
t h e  aircraft aerodynamics (e.g., p a r t i a l  loss of a ho r i zon ta l  
v e r t i c a l  s t a b i l i z e r  o r  p a r t i a l  wing loss). The ARM can handle 
t h e s e  cases when new l inea r  models are a v a i l a b l e ,  but the devel- 
opment of such models is wre d i f f i c u l t  i n  t h e s e  f a i l u r e  cases .  
Est imat ion methods and the  e f f ec t iveness  of t he  A R M  i n  dea l ing  
wi th  aerodynamic changes should be inves t iga ted .  
8 .  The compensator redesign algorithm is based on the  LQ method, 
which r equ i r e s  f u l l - s t a t e  feedback. Methods t h a t  requi re  only 
output  feedback would be of i n t e r e s t  i n  f u r t h e r  i nves t iga t ions .  
The c a p a b i l i t i e s  of the  t r i m  a lgori thm would a l s o  be a f f ec t ed  
by the  use  of output  feedback. 
9. Performance i s s u e s  i n  i n t e g r a t i o n  were discussed.  Analytic 
methods f o r  addressing these i s sues  are h ighly  important i n  
developing e a r l y  confidence i n  any RFCS des ign  program, and 
would be a u s e f u l  f u t u r e  e f f o r t .  
- 
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Figure A.2-1. ROO1, CT1, N o  Fai lure,  F u l l  FCS (Continued) 
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Figure A.3-1 .  R006, Full FCS, No Reconfiguration 
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Figure A.3-1. R006, Full FCS, No Reconfiguration (Continued) 
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Figure A.3-2. R025, Full FCS, Reconfiguration, Real FDI 
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Figure A.3-3. R026, Full FCS, Reconfiguration, Perfect FDI 
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Figure A.3-3. R026, Full FCS, Reconfiguration, Perfect FDI (Continued) 
A-2 1 
0 L E T  STFD CWG 
21 RIGHT 3.43 CUD 
4- 0 LEFT ST$E S R W  





" o L E F T E L E V ~ B  
0 L E F T O T V ~ K Y G  
A M E L E V M  Left d R i g h t  b flloKi ELEV SERW 
I I I I I I 
Elev.. c iq  
h,  it/sec 2 
0 
-30 t 
I I I I 1 I I I I I I 1 
Q 5 1 0 1 5 2 0 2 5 3 0 3 5 4 0 4 5 5 0 5 5 8 0  
Time, sec 
- R4800 
Figure A.3-3. R026, Full FCS, Reconfiguration, Perfect FDI (Concluded) 
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Figure A.4-1. R034, CT4, Limited PCS, No Reconfiguration (Continued) 
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Figure A.4-2. R035, CT4, Limited FCS, Ful l  Reconfiguration 
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Figure A.4-2. R035, CT4, Limited FCS, Full Reconfiguration (Continued) 
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Figure A S - 1 .  R032, CT1, Limited FCS, No Reconfiguration (Continued) 
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Figure A.6-1. R030, C T L ,  Limited FCS, No Reconfiguration (Continued) 
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Figure A.6-2. R031, CTL, L i m i t e d  FCS, Ful l  Reconfiguration (Continued) 
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Figure A.7-2. R018, CTL, Full FCS, F u l l  Reconfiguration 
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Figure A.7-2. R018, CT1, Full FCS, Full Reconfiguration (Continued) 
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